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reflections on a 75th anniversary

Yu

remember the old story about the blind men describing an elephant, don't you? The
creature was either a rope, a tube or a wall, depending on whether the man had his hand on the tail,
the trunk or the haunch. This image occurs to me whenever I think of people attempting to put into
actual terms the vision of Valparaiso University invoked by the now-legendary president O.P. Kretzmann. Though he was the third president, and not a founder as such, there is little doubt that O.P.'s
rhetoric gave words to the hopes and plans of the group of men who, fifteen years before he became
its president, actually founded Valpo. His words were memorable and quotable, and though, for a
talking person, he left very little in the printed record, what he did leave has been used often as
touchstone, as guide, and as inspiration for the generations of those who have tried to determine
what Valpo is supposed to be.
I've been one of those people since I was eighteen; that's forty-two years of trying. But others
have been at it longer-former Cresset editor John Strietelmeier the most eloquent among them,
closely followed by Richard Lee. Another was Sue Wienhorst, one of the most purely intellectual
people ever to understand and articulate a vision for Valparaiso University. Taking her lead from
O.P.'s inaugural address, Sue once presented at a University convocation a carefully reasoned essay
in which she laid out precisely an elaborate exposition of Valparaiso University as the fusion of
Athens and Jerusalem. Afterward, she was more than astonished when O.P. came up to her to say
that her description was not at all what he had meant. '~bsolutely wrong," he had muttered, "I said
there could be a meeting of the two, but never a fusion. Only a co-existence, never an amalgam.
Wrong. Wrong." Sue used to tell this with her usual hoarse guffaw, but she nevertheless remained
for years hurt and baffled by this judgment of failure.
Indeed, our history may perhaps best be told in terms of the record of attempts to articulate
the vision. Jim Nuechterlein, another Cresset editor, had his turn in an essay on Athens and
Jerusalem in the Midwest published some years ago in The American Scholar. I've decided that this
anniversary is the occasion on which to describe my version of the mosc meaningful failure in my
experience of Valpo, a failure from which I (and no doubt others) learned the dangers of trying to
give substance to anything as powerful and as mystifying as a vision.

getting it wrong
In the 1958-59 school year, Valpo's Department of Religion (as it was then called) launched its
new program of study for all freshmen, a set of courses somewhat modestly called New Testament
Readings. Since the course was required for all freshman who had not obtained an exemption, and
since it was explained to us with much seriousness and no little fanfare in large orientation gatherings as well as in our classrooms, the course was an instant cause celebre. As students, we freshmen
were new at the game, and some of us were rather excited not only by the course itself, but by the
tremendous commotion it seemed to be causing on campus. Let me first describe the course, and
then the commotion.
The course had several components, but its basic structure derived from the Church lectionary,
that is, from the series of readings appointed for each Sunday's worship services. In the first year,
the primary material for the week's course work derived from the Sunday Gospel, in the second
year, from the Epistle reading. Thus the course content tended to move things along briskly, week

by week, with a theme and an energy that was clearly extra-curricular, since it came from the
Church's calendar. In addition to this basic reading-usually no more than a dozen verses of Scripture-many pages of current systematic theology were assigned as collateral reading, and so there
might be as many as 25 or 30 pages of densely-written material each week on the themes brought
up by the reading. Further readings in that first year included Arthur Miller's Death of a Salesman,
and Per Lagerqvist's Barabbas. The syllabus then listed 3, 4 or 5 questions, and every student was
required to write, during the week, a brief essay in response to each of the questions, this essay to be
handed in after two class sessions. Discussion was required, and we swiftly found that our practiced
ways of discussing Biblical texts were no longer adequate. We were not allowed to diminish or erase
or smooth over contradictions or problem passages; rather we were encouraged to focus on these
and confront their difficulties straight on, guided by this principle: Lutheran theology and Lutheran
reading of the Bible are characterized by a careful discernment of Law and Gospel. Therefore, as we
worked on each reading, each proposition, each discussion point, each essay, we were trained to
develop skill in answering this question: is it Law, or is it Gospel? We applied this question to what
we heard in the sermons on Sunday, in homilies during daily Chapel, and even to hymns, dorm
devotions-and to those questions and musings within our hearts.
It probably goes without saying that this took up a lot of time, for students and for teachers.
And the course gave, in each semester, just two hours of credit, which was the allotted number of
credits that would eventually make up the eight that every student was required to have in religion
by the end of the sophomore year. A member of the Religion Department could expect to teach at
least three sections of this course as half of his load, and that might mean, at four essays per student
per week, about 4800 essays per semester, just for two courses! (To ease the burden somewhat, student readers were assigned to each staff member, and in my sophomore year I was one of those.)
I have no idea what must have transpired as its designers developed the course and brought it
over the various hurdles that such programs have to leap in order to become requirements in a university curriculum. But I have pushed enough course revisions over enough of these hurdles in the
years since to know that the arguments must have been both exhilarating and exhausting. I imagine
these course-shapers began by taking a vision seriously, and then trying to give it a curricular form.
What would it look like to have Athens (the tradition of rigorous and rational examination of texts
and the relentless development of discerning questions) and Jerusalem (the tradition of faithful
worship and observance of daily disciplines of prayer and reverence for the holy texts) brought
together in a classroom? What would this feel like in day-to-day practice? Would not a Lutheran
university be the ideal place to make this kind of conjunction happen? After all, if we were at the
same time justus et peccator, could we not also be simultaneously rigorous and devout in our religious knowledge and life? Would that not be the ideal for a Lutheran university?
Apparently not. Though NTR remained for some years the official religion curriculum for the
first two years of a student's career, it soon became an attenuated and eviscerated version of itself,
then optional and then marginalized and finally abandoned. As I have mentioned, the course immediately caused controversy. From the outset, I was one of those who relished its challenges, and its
very oddity became a matter of personal pride. In fact, it defined what Valparaiso University meant
for me; it became what I tried to describe when I was asked why I went so far away to college,
instead of attending Stanford, or the newly-developing, nearby and free University of California at
Riverside. To me it perfectly embodied the vision. To others, it was anathema. The outcries against
it came from many sources, and to examine these in some detail will, I think, describe some of the
difficulties faced by any who would attempt to make a vision of a university into a reality. The criticisms, phrased most briefly, were these: too demanding, too experimental, too experiential, too
confident, too modern, and too religious. I attempt to give an account of these objections as they
appear to me now, always recognizing that my perspective was partial and limited, though because
of those staff meetings to which student graders were (at first) welcomed, I had a first-hand view of
the way these criticisms functioned within the department itself.
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too demanding
This one is self-evident. The amount of time required, not to mention the degree of intense
scrutiny of one's beliefs and the bases for those beliefs, was unreasonable. Students were quickly upin-arms, even at dear old apathetic Valpo. And faculty in other departments resented the disproportionate amount of time students devoted to the work in NTR.
too experimental
This complaint came from old guard faculty in a number of fields, including the Religion
Department, who resented the leap-frogging into intellectual territory of a department that had
seemed for many years a safe bastion for Sunday School instruction. The shift from what this department had offered to what it now demanded seemed to them entirely too quick, rather like sleightof-hand. and based on un-tried techniques. Most of the faculty within the department who supported the course were young, and they drew the automatic criticisms that always follow the
Young Turks in any era.
too experiential
This criticism came from a small new minority of faculty at Valpo, mostly in the sciences, who
did not want "life" confused with "learning." They were for Valpo the first wave of secular graduate school products who were, even if personally pious (and most of them were) determined to
make a clear separation between their "discipline" and their "faith." They had absorbed the notion
that "faith" had been disqualified as an element of thinking, and that objectivity required that the
scholar strip any personal considerations from his examination of the subject. This sounds quaint
today, but it was the first tremor at Valpo of the groundswell that overtook all of academe by the
mid-eighties, and has only gradually subsided since that time.
too confident
Another wave, also under the influence of the new university- (not seminary-) trained faculty,
was the developing "departmental culture." Departments were growing in autonomy, turf wars
were beginning to get serious, and the chutzpah of the Religions Department re-doing its requirements, and then making claims not just for itself but for campus life as a whole was too much. This
faction resented the scope of NTR, its confident claims to present within the modern university curriculum a place for theology much closer to its role as Queen of the Sciences, the very lynch pin of
learning itself. Training in theologically adept thinking was a goal in the course, and a challenge to
faculty whose aim at that point began to be developing a culture unique to each discipline: physics
majors were to be trained to think like physicists, history majors like historians. The claim of this
department to provide an all-encompassing "way of thinking" enraged some faculty.
too modern
This critique came from a faction that believed that the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod was
beginning to suffer from an excess of European theological and Biblical modernism. This critique
centered on the use of current German systematicians like Leonhardt Goeppelt and Karl Barth, or
pastoral theologians like Helmut Thieleke and Dietrich Bonhoeffer (most of these often translated
on the fly by members of the department like Bob Bertram, Ed Schroeder and Bob Schultz.) The
anxiety about this potentially dangerous influence culminated of course in the crisis of the St. Louis
Seminary and the break-up of the Synod almost twenty years later. But even in 1958, a prototype of
that conflict was evident at Valpo.
too religious
This criticism, leveled by students and by faculty, and eventually by O.P. himself, focused on
Chapel attendance. It was already a University requirement that freshmen attend a daily worship
service; now that attendance would be part of a course requirement. At some point in the Religion
Department's deliberations, they must have felt that here was the unique opportunity to encompass
both intellectual and faithful practice. A member of the department was appointed to head this
endeavor, and and elaborate system of upperclass students as "stewards" was initiated. Each of
these stewards was responsible to sit with and track the attendance of about 25 freshmen, and to
visit any delinquent ones, encouraging their compliance. Finally it was their duty to report to the

department any obdurate refusers. Since each week's course materials consisted of the Gospel readings for the week, and since these were also the subjects of homilies and Sunday sermons, this tightknit integration of worship content and course content must have appeared logical-if rigorousto its designers. It proved, however, to be the immediate flashpoint. It turned out that the administration did not want to enforce a chapel attendance policy; it merely wanted to have one in place.
The faculty member in charge of Chapel attendance was as immovable as some of the student nonattenders and was dismissed from that position. The department was informed that it could not
require chapel attendance as part of a course requirement. Religion as practice was not to be curricularized, even to bring about the unique combination of Athens and Jerusalem that the vision
appeared to suggest.
getting it right?
That's one account. There are others. The sources of criticism no doubt each had hold of
another part of the elephant. There were too many versions of the vision. Perhaps the difficulty in
being a Lutheran university lies too deeply within the heart of what is Lutheran-a persistent distrust of systems and authority, a latent antinomianism that threatens any kind of community built
on universally expected practices. Where will we look for guidance on turning our visions into
reality? Certainly not to marketing experts, helpful as these might be in strategies for presenting the
vision broadly. Nor should we rely on satisfaction surveys, useful as these might be for tracking the
coherence between the vision and the perception of that vision by the next generation. (If John
Ciardi can say, "A university is what a college becomes when the faculty loses interest in students,"
and Paul Romano can say, ''A college is what a university becomes when its faculty and administrators lose interest in truth," then I would add this: ''A summer camp is what a university becomes
when the satisfaction of its current students becomes its sole focus.")
Anniversaries give us too much time to think about the past, when there is an urgency about
getting on with the future. At Valparaiso University, we may perhaps look to Christ College as our
most successful attempt to embody the vision, though it has the limitation of affecting only some,
not all of the community's members. Those who care about institutions usually search out successes
as a way to examine history and identity. It may be that we will find more of value than we suspect
when we look carefully at our best failures.

Peace,

GME
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Of Salamanders, Saints, and Scientists
David W. Fagerberg

0

ne of the most impo.tant tasks in a society is the education of its children, so I do not
want the reader to take lightly the hypothetical assignment I am about to propose just because it is
hypothetical. Suppose that I could magically invest you, the reader, with the responsibility of
ordering a classroom textbook for school instruction and suppose, further, that in the course of
your review you found a textbook which contained this surprising bit of information: salamanders
live in fire. Could you conceive of any circumstances under which you would order such a text?
Would you, for example, order such a text as a science book for a class of credulous first-graders
eager to learn about the animal class Amphibia? If you understood your charge to consist of finding
a reliable, accurate, truthful book, which gives elementary students correct information as far as we
know it, then perhaps you would hesitate to order an author who teaches that bats live in caves,
bears live in dens, and salamanders live in fire. In rejecting this book, you would not be prejudicial
to the child's right to hear alternate opinions about newt habitats any more than you would be prejudicial to a child's broad education for rejecting a book in human biology which taught the theory
of the stork alongside the theory of sperm and egg. If this is narrow-minded, then it is a useful sort
of narrow-mindedness when your goal is to teach the truth.
Now, the situation would be altogether different if you were not buying a book to teach the
truth. If you were buying a book of theories, instead of a book of facts, then I could well imagine
you including a textbook with surprising salamander theories. For example, people in the Middle
Ages thought salamanders lived in fire, and you might find this fact in a history book on medieval
zoology. But even then, it would be a fact about medieval opinion, not about medieval salamanders,
and ordering a book with this information for a college history course would be completely different from ordering this book for the curriculum of a science class. My hypothetical assignment
turns on this question: are you ordering books for a class which teaches the truth, even if we include
the caveat "as we know it," or are you ordering books of theories, untested theories, some false theories, theories no longer true or applicable?
I suggest that that is also the question we need to consider in order to understand the Church's
reaction to Aristotle when the great philosopher reappeared on the scene in the Middle Ages. The
twentieth-century Academy usually casts the thirteenth-century Church as a censorious and repressive agent in its magisterial role of textbook purchaser for the University of Paris, banning natural
science from free-thinkers and stomping academic freedom flat as it forced students to read their
Aristotle on the sly, but I am proposing that we would see matters in a different light if we thought
of the Church as sharing the same responsibility I just tried to create in you, namely, the responsibility of ordering true books. It would be one thing if the magisterium was ordering books for a
class which teaches the truth, even if we add the caveat "as we know it," and another if it was
ordering books of theories, untested theories, some false theories, theories no longer true or applicable. Was Aristotle true? That was the question.
It was a new question, not only because Aristotle had been newly rediscovered, but because
with his recovery there came a new attitude toward facts, says Chesterton.

Even a little
perspective on our
medieval parents
should make us
more sympathetic
to their dilemmas.
Aquinas,
Chesterton and
Fagerberg want
to give us that
perspective.

Most of the Schoolmen, if informed by the only informants they had that a unicorn has one horn
or a salamander lives in the fire, still used it more as an illustration of logic than an incident of life.
What they really said was, 'If a unicorn has one horn, two unicorns have as many horns as one cow.'
And that is not one inch the less a fact because the unicorn is a fable. But with Albertus in medieval
times, as with Aristotle in ancient times, there did begin something like the idea of emphasizing the
question: 'But does the unicorn only have one horn or the salamander a fire instead of a fire-side?'
Doubtless when the social and geographical limits of medieval life began to allow them to search the
fire for salamanders or the desert for unicorns, they had to modify many of their scientific ideas.
(St. Thomas Aquinas, 455-456)

It is true that since this dilemma over Aristotle was faced by the textbook purchasers at Paris, we
have accumulated a bigger pile of facts than they knew or Aristotle knew, ranging from genomes to
galaxies. But that is just a contingency. Our bigger pile of facts is contingent upon having had the
time to compile them and the academic infrastructure to spread them around. In the eight hundred
intervening years we have had the opportunity to look around inside these newly emphasized questions, and while we have every reason to be proud of our bigger pile of facts, we have no right to
our arrogance which believes that modern scientists seek only truth while medieval scientists were
satisfied with fancy or were instructed by the Church to be satisfied with fancy. I propose that the
question as to whether or not Aristotle should be taught in the university classroom sounded to
them like asking whether or not false science should be taught in the first grade classroom sounds to
us. Granted, the facts we know have changed, but that does not change the fundamental question.
The question is only changed if the university is no longer interested in teaching truth. Then the
question is moot, and it does not matter whether the metaphysics textbook or the mathematics textbook is true.
The problem, of course, is that we believe mathematics can be true or false, while we no longer
believe metaphysics can be true or false, but that is not because our pile of facts is bigger, it is because
our science is smaller. Chesterton told of a shift in emphasis from a priori reasoning (one horn plus
another horn makes two horns) to a posteriori observation (show me a one-horned beast). Albert
the Great was "the father of science [who] unrolled his scroll of strange wisdom; of sun and comet,
of fish and bird. He was an Aristotelian developing, as it were, the one experimental hint of Aristotle; and in this he was entirely original" (Ibid., 456). But when this shift was made, it was not to
the exclusion of reason! Albert's experimental wisdom in the natural sciences did not conflict with
his intellectual wisdom in the theological sciences. He was perfectly capable of teaching about both
amphibians and angels. Etienne Gilson has defined the medieval concept of science as a virtue
(which means the power to act) which "puts reason into a state in which it can judge certain objects
of knowledge soundly." That is why the range of subjects which were called "sciences" by the
medieval thinker was larger than the range of subjects called "science" today. The modern person
habitually restricts science to empirical objects, believing these are the only objects which can be
soundly judged, while the medieval person included theology and metaphysics as sciences, believing
these subjects were in need of sound judgment, too. This constriction of the subject matter in science accounts for why our children are well-schooled in the habits of salamanders but are unempowered to make sound judgments about the metaphysical tomfoolery making up the plot lines of
so many television shows and movies, unscientific theories regarding the union of soul and body,
the character of divine cause, the activity of angelic natures, and the state of postmortem existence.
Modernity would have us believe that since science deals only with knowable objects (the
phrase is meant tautologically: only objects are knowable), and theology is not a science (the phrase
is meant definitively: theology is the sticky domain of things which cannot be judged but only irrationally believed), therefore theological interference in the scientific realm is unreasonable censorship (the phrase is thought to be self-evident: all censorship is unreasonable). So I am back to the
problem of ordering textbooks: should the Church be censured for censoring some of Aristotle's
writings? It all depends what one is teaching. As it is one thing to tell college students a true state-
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-ment about medieval zoology and another thing to tell first-graders a false statement about salamanders, so it is one thing to read Aristotle for the purpose of seeing what the pagan philosopher
said and another to use Aristotle as a textbook in theology class. We want to tell the truth in zoology
or theology, mathematics or metaphysics-this is science, after all-and Aristotle had been used by
some to teach error about the eternal existence of matter, and divine action, and human epistemology, and the role of the agent intellect.
So how did the Church react to this pagan philosopher when he was newly recovered? Those
who see this as an issue of academic freedom, in the sense of free access, do so because of their
vision of the ecclesiastical behemoth. "There is in the world, they would tell us, a powerful and persecuting superstition, intoxicated with the impious idea of having a monopoly of divine truth, and
therefore cruelly crushing and exterminating everything else as error. It burns thinkers for thinking,
discoverers for discovering, philosophers and theologians who differ by a hair's breadth from its
dogmas; it will tolerate no tiny change or shadow of variety even among its friends and followers; it
sweeps the whole world with one encyclical cyclone of uniformity... ."(The Thing, 192). But the
Church's attitude was not uniform toward Aristotle because Aristotle's works were not uniform.
When first recovered, his texts on metaphysics and natural philosophy were prohibited in 1215,
yes, but his study on ethics was not forbidden, and students were actually ordered to study his logical works. In other words, the same authorities permitted some works, and prescribed other works,
by the very man whose certain works they proscribed. To appreciate this latitudinarian spirit,
imagine a parallel example in which some referee board on a modern scientific journal consistently
refuses to print a certain scientist's papers because he holds positions thought untenable by the
whole community of scholars, and yet that very board orders his book for their own children's first
science class. That is how Christian scholasticism treated Aristotle.
"But a referee board would not excommunicate someone for his errors," the modern critic
says, still complaining about medieval censorship. True. The Church has no right to excommunicate
someone over a scientific fact, since it is an ecclesiastical act to excommunicate and should only be
applied against heretical errors, not errors of the empirical or biological variety. But if an instructor
claimed to be only teaching biology when he or she said human beings may be raised as animals and
sold for slaughter because it is a biological fact that they are as nutritious as poultry, one might
politely suggest that that instructor has stepped out of biology into another realm; I might think to
call it theological anthropology. I am not an ethicist ready to point out the number of fronts at
which we are poised to step beyond simple empirical science into more complex questions that
would benefit from the wisdom of theological science; I am just an observer of modern hubris,
ready to point out that although some of Aristotle had been used for untrue metaphysics, what had
not been was not only permitted but ordered, and as soon as the rest of him was no longer suspect,
the ban was lifted.
"But Aristotle was right," the critic says. About many things, yes; about all things, no; and as
soon as the Church knew the difference, it raised Aristotle's corpus from the past. "[I]t was a purely
Christian miracle which raised the great Pagan from the dead .... [Only Thomas's] huge and solid
orthodoxy could have supported so many things which then seemed to be unorthodox .... Whether
or not he baptized Aristotle, he was truly the godfather of Aristotle; he was his sponsor; he swore
that the old Greek would do no harm; and the whole world trusted his word" (St. Thomas Aquinas,
492). Theology is a science which, like any power, needs to be practiced until it is gotten right, and
then practiced upon the available data. Like any scientist, the theologian delayed teaching as true
something which required more consideration until it could be judged soundly. Yet even during the
moratorium, it assigned those works by the "great pagan" which could be reconciled with "the
great fact" which Christianity knew with factual certainty.
Let us be clear what this means: by 'Revelation' in this context is meant, primarily, not inspiration and prophecy, but a unique historical event of shattering importance. It was not the fault of
Aristotle that he had lived before the time of Christ-but there it was. Since he wrote, an
event had occurred which had changed the whole orientation of philosophy, history and ethics.

Whatever was, in fact, true, remained true-the general revelation given to all men by the light of
reason could not, ultimately, be irreconcilable with the especial revelation given in Jesus Christ; but
it must, in the nature of things, be imperfect. And to trust it implicitly would be dangerous .... The
medieval Church was dubious about entrusting her children to a philosophy that was, literally, out
of date in the Year One (Sayers, 94).

David Fagerberg
teaches liturgical
studies in the
Religion Department
of of Concordia
College,
Moorhead, MN.

Of whatever other faults scholasticism may have been culpable, surely it cannot be charged with
narrow-mindedness when it tried to accommodate, simultaneously, all the reality which heaven has
revealed and reason has discovered. In its broad-mindedness, scholasticism was unwilling to live in
parallel universes, one earthly and the other heavenly, one using Aristotelian reason and the other
Abrahamic faith. It was unwilling to conclude that the truths of the science of theology were irrelevant to the truths of the burgeoning empirical science, or vice versa. Here were some, even in those
early stages, who tried to separate the sciences in just that way.
Siger of Brabant said this: the church must be right theologically, but she can be wrong scientifically. There are two truths; the truth of the supernatural world, and the truth of the natural world,
which contradicts the supernatural world. While we are being naturalists, we can suppose that
Christianity is all nonsense; but then, when we remember that we are Christians, we must admit that
Christianity is true even if it is nonsense. In other words, Siger of Brabant split the human head in
two, like the blow in an old legend of battle; and he declared that a man has two minds, with one of
which he must entirely believe and with the other may utterly disbelieve (St. Thomas Aquinas, 474).

We have followed Siger of Brabant. We have taken the easier way out, a schizophrenic way
out, teaching our children about salamanders but neglecting the sacred, under the belief that we
cannot make sound and common judgments about the latter because it only consists of opinion and
never truth. We believe that the science of metaphysics and theology is culturally conditioned, personally idiosyncratic, privately constructed, and therefore no public conversation can be had, no
common understanding can be persuasive, no judgments about true or false can be rendered. But
there was a time when our small science of secondary, empirical causes and the larger science about
the principle and final cause of things were integrated. St. Thomas was willing to allow the one
truth to be approached by two paths, precisely because he was sure there was only one truth. Because
the Faith was the one truth, nothing discovered in nature could ultimately contradict the Faith.
Because the Faith was the one truth, nothing really deduced from the Faith could ultimately contradict the facts. It was in truth a curiously daring confidence in the reality of his religion.
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Re-membering Finnegan
James Joyce's masterpiece in the age of cyberspace
Michael Sexson

"joyce is, in the Wake, making his own Altamira cave drawings of the entire history of the human
mind, in terms of its basic gestures and postures during all phases of human culture and technology."
Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy

J

ames Joyce's Finnegans Wake (no apostrophe please) is the most famous unread book in the
world. Its author devoted most of his waking hours and all of his dreaming nights for a period
of sixteen years creating 628 pages of what even highly literate people consider inspired gibberish, a
colossal literary white elephant. Since 1939, when Finnegans Wake was published in completed
form, the book has attracted a fair amount of attention from a handful of die-hard "Wakies," but
not nearly the notice that Joyce's earlier works received. The book is not simply demanding as was
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, or extremely difficult like Ulysses; it is mindbogglingly obscure.
The claim that the book seems to have been written in another language doesn't do justice to its
obscurity; in fact, it is written in dozens of other languages, from Albanian and Bog Latin to Old
Church Slavonic and Serbo-Croatian. Open the book anywhere and begin reading. Here is a randomly chosen line from p. 351: "My droomodose days Y loved you abover all the strest. Blowhole
brasshat and boy with his boots off and the butch of our bunch and all. It was buckoo boozer,
beleeme." Or from page 5 23: "Pro general continuation and in particular explication to your singular interrogation our asseveralation. Ladiegent, pals will smile but me and Frisky Shorty, my
inmate friend, as is uncommon struck on popular poetry.... "
Ezra Pound admonished Joyce not to pursue his disastrous project; literary agent Harriet
Weaver, long an admirer of Joyce's early works, wondered whether the genius had gone insane; his
friends and confidants stood by helplessly as more and more of this linguistic monster appeared in
small magazines. In 1928, H.G. Wells penned the line which may be the most often quoted condemnation of the work: "Who the hell is this Joyce who demands so many waking hours of the few
thousands I have still to live for a proper appreciation of his quirks and fancies and flashes of rendering?" (Ellman, 621). Three decades later Vladimir Nabokov would call the Wake a "cold pudding of a book" (71). In 1966, Clive Hart, a devoted Wakie, claimed that he doubts if there are a
dozen people apart from professional Joyceans anywhere who have actually in good faith read
Finnegans Wake from beginning to end (135).
Until recently the matter seemed closed. Finnegans Wake would continue its shadowy existence in an academic Hades fueled by the energies of a relatively small band of scholars squabbling
with one another over who had "really" read the book as opposed to who had just pretended. And
then something remarkable happened. The Web woke the Wake from its deep slumber.
Finnegans Wake is everything anyone has ever said about it and more. The tens of thousands of
transparent overlays in the book Uoyce actually called his method of composition "working in
layers") added up to nothing less than ... well, than everything. Like Plato before him, Joyce felt
that human beings, while awake, exist in a state of profound forgetfulness of who they are and
where they came from. Our birth, in Wordsworth's famous lines, is "but a sleep and a forgetting."
The human creature is the one who has fallen into what the Greeks called amathia, the ignorance
that stems from forgetfulness of everything important. In the Wake Joyce exults in the irony that
we are most asleep when we are awake and only in sleep do we begin to awaken to all we have
forgotten.

Lizzenup lit lovers
and
Websters too
as it's pay forward
time>
time to homage
the Big Fromage
of modernist think.
Hyper/ink it
or leave it,
boyzngurls.

The Wake comes out of the foggy dew, like the ghost of Hamlet's father, intoning "Remember
Me," or as Anna Livia rephrases it on the last page of the book, combining "remember" with
"memory," "Mememoreme." If Finnegans Wake could possibly be summed up in a single word, that
word would be "remember." It is a grand Joycean word which does a lot of work, so much in fact
that as Humpty Dumpty (a pervasive influence in the Wake) says to Alice, you have to pay it extra.
To remember is not only to bring to mind what has been hiding, but also to reassemble carnally, to
re-member, to rebuild fleshy bits into an animate whole. It is simultaneously a mental and physical
act, linking word to image and gesture, mediated experience to pantomime. Authentic remembering gives the Book back its body, which, so to speak, had been mutilated by print culture and
scattered to the winds, littering the landscape. Of utmost importance in Finnegans Wake is the figure
of Isis, the Egyptian goddess faced with the task of reassembling her dead husband/brother Osiris,
dismembered by his brother Set and his body parts cast away, like geminating seeds, to the far corners of the land. Isis finds all the pieces of her late husband except his phallus. She constructs a new
one out of wood, impregnates herself, and restores life to her dead consort. This, to Joyce, is what
remembering is really about: not vague recollection but the fashioning of a body, wholly body,
replete with regenerative functions. It is the finding of all the missing letters (litter) and the reshaping
of them into a text with texture, taste, and tactility, a text shot through with the infinite varieties of
thought and action in this world.
The act of unforgetting that is Finnegans Wake recalls us to the notion that before books there
was speech and before speech mute gesture, powerful icon, and primal sound. Acts of remembering
had to do with movement and with picture: the daily peregrinations of the sun and moon; the rotation of clusters of stars; rituals of the hunt or gathering of food accompanied by rhythmic grunts or
howls; the sudden terrifying bolt of lightning followed by the menacing rumble of thunder. Unlike
the databases we now consult in order to "learn" something, these mute markers and markings had
a profoundly visceral effect. This was learning by inscription. That which was seen, heard, and done
was indelibly imprinted on the very nervous system of the observer, listener, actor. Today we go to
the museum to have an "educational experience." The phrase itself is suggestive of profound forgetfulness, the banal words of the unawakened. In the Paleolithic era, by contrast, we can imagine
that a visit to the rotunda of the great caves at Lascaux resulted not in an educational experience but
a dramatic and theatrical encounter, a shattering engagement which simultaneously dismembered
and re-membered the initiate, mutely cowering before the power of the mysterium tremendum.
To achieve the effect of the pre-literate experience of reality, Joyce borrowed from ancient
mnemonic arts which stressed the inscription within mental space of powerful images. The typical
pre-book memory system involved imagining an enclosed space such as a cave, a house, castle or
palace, which had familiar partitions or niches. Entering the mindscape, the mnemonist would
"deposit" an image, often unusual or grotesque, alongside the information that was to be recalled.
When one wished to remember what otherwise might have dropped into oblivion, one entered the
memory grotto and embarked on what Joyce calls in the first page of the Wake "a commodius vicus
of recirculation," a trip around the inside of the skull in order to revisit important images representing a "body" of forgotten information.
When that body of information was nothing less than everything, memory systems took on
occult and magical properties. Such was the case with Giordano Bruno (a primary influence in the
Wake after the apostle of eternal return, Giambatista Vico), a great Renaissance philosopher, monk,
and magician who, through his reading of the famous (and dangerous) occult text of Hermes Trismegistus, devised elaborate memory treatises of stupefying complexity all in service of the notion
that an individual who genuinely remembers ascends through seven spheres in which he has been
imprisoned, gaining passage through the use of secret words given to malevolent powers who rule
each sphere, coming ultimately to a realization of total knowledge which is also his freedom and
apotheosis. The aim of such a transformation could only be realized, Bruno thought, if one committed to memory the entire universe and keyed that knowledge to significant images.
Also important for situating Finnegans Wake within the tradition of magical memory systems is
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the story of Giulio Camillo. Though virtually forgotten today, Camillo was, according to Frances
Yates in her book The Art of Memory, one of the most noted celebrities of the sixteenth century.
Not content merely to theorize about memory theaters, Camillo actually built one out of wood, an
intricate construction (now a seductive centerfold in the Yates book) arranged in seven rising grades
of seven partitions, spanning out like the rays of the sun from seven nodal points called "The Seven
Pillars of Solomon's House of Wisdom." A spectator entering the structure would discover himself
on a stage looking down into the "audience" where he beheld a vast array of mythic images, primarily the planetary gods, each keyed to one another and to the whole, which, presumably, was the
psyche or soul. Communing with the images in the theater, a participant would achieve the practical
virtue of being able to discourse on any subject whatever and, ultimately, the metaphysical virtue of
recognizing, in the presence of the totality of knowledge, his own divinity.
Yates quotes a skeptical contemporary of Camillo, one Viglius Zuichemus, as saying of the
magus: "He calls this theater of his by many names, saying now that it is a... constructed mind and
soul, and now that it is a windowed one. He pretends that all things that the human mind can conceive and which we cannot see with the corporeal eye, after being collected together by diligent
meditation may be expressed by certain corporeal signs in such a way that the beholder may at once
perceive with the eyes everything that is otherwise hidden in the depths of the human mind" (132).
The conviction of the Renaissance magus that nothing is ever lost but exists as forgotten material in the infinite reaches of the human mind and moreover that such material is accessible through
mnemonic techniques, and most astonishing of all, that the remembering of such material is tantamount not only to a rebirth of wonder but to an apotheosis, a translation of the human into the
divine, of the mortal into the immortal-such a conviction led to Bruno's being burned at the stake
in 1600 for heresy and to the dissolution of Camillo's theater into the litter of the age of magic and
superstition. Three centuries after the martyrdom of Bruno, in what has become known as Late
Modernism, James Joyce will attempt to reclaim that sense of excitement and wonder and affirm
that all gods and demons reside within the human mind by sculpting his own labyrinthine memory
palace. But the house that Joyce builds will be markedly different from his predecessors. Three
hundred years will see the triumph of secular democracies and witness new theories about the
nature of matter and the universe. A Viennese doctor will change forever the way humans understand the mind, sleep, and dreams. And new technologies based on electricity-the radio, telegraph,
telephone, and television-will dramatically reshape the sense of reality invented by writing and
mass production of printed books. Whatever "everything important" meant to the Renaissance
philosopher, it has now come to mean immeasurably more.
Joyce himself added to the difficulty if not the impossibility of his grandiose enterprise by
eradicating the distinction between high and low culture. For Joyce, significant images, relevant
sounds, and important actions were to be found not only in history and myth but in the ordinary
world, in cheap calendars, advertising jingles and comic strips, in children's jump rope rhymes and
popular ballads, in the mundane activities of people living banal quotidian lives. We do not have to
go to the museum to behold the paintings of the old masters in order to enter the deep realm of significant memory; we need only, just before sleep, to have glanced at the mass-produced picture on
the calendar we got free from the local filling station; we don't require Bach, we need only recall
the melody of the popular tune played ceaselessly on the radio; we don't have to don the white
gown of the initiate and enter the dark cave where the high priest will conduct the rites of the Great
Mysteries; we need only put on our nightshirt and cap, turn out the light, and there we will be, in
the fabulous cavern of memory, ready once again to replay the old story of ends and beginnings, of
death and resurrection, of £inns and agains, until we wake and forget. To Joyce, we all become
artists when we fall asleep, as the unconscious takes whatever is available to the senses and weaves
out of such unpromising material an all-encompassing drama that is simultaneously our own inimitable narrative and the endlessly replayed story of everybody else.
Joyce, like Camillo before him, found himself at a loss to say just what it was he was creating.
At one time he described the work as a "wheel" that was all "square." Another time he said it was a

"coach with six insides." It was undoubtedly a book, but like no other book that ever existed (as
well as a replication of every other book that existed). Perhaps the least unsatisfactory definition of
the text comes from the creature itself: "It will remember itself from every sides, with all gestures,
in each our word" (614). The "it" is the book itself as bodily being, sentient and reflective, able to
understand itself in words and beyond words, through words, behind words, to the gestures that
preceded and gave birth to words.
For Joyce what was missing in books was that primal gesture, the mute motion charged with
preliterate power. Like a human being, a Book needed to grow and change, move, have bodily functions, change its mind, experience shifts in mood and sensibility. Words needed to get up off the
page and do an Irish jig; the sentence must become a "soundance." But the Book, despite its enormous power to create virtual worlds for readers, was essentially a claustrophobic technology confined by a restrictive set of linguistic conventions. The Book was inert, saying the same thing each
time the reader opened it. Joyce wanted to create a book-as-person who, each time you saw her,
surprised you with something you hadn't expected yet still was recognizable as an individual. But
how was this to be done?
From Lewis Carroll Joyce borrowed the idea of the word as portmanteau, literally a large
leather suitcase with two hinged compartments, but to Humpty Dumpty explicating the poem "Jabberwocky" it is one word with two meanings, like "slithy" meaning both lithe and slimy. Joyce's
portmanteau, however, had many more compartments than Carroll's. A single word could carry
three, four and often more meanings depending on how alert, literate, playful, and multilingual the
reader was. The portmanteau word, combined with multilingual puns and other ingenious paranamastic techniques, created the illusion of density and motion.
But something was still missing. Joyce wanted to discover that which would genuinely animate, literally, "ensoul," the book, to awaken the recumbent giant into gross corporeal existence.
That something was electricity. The thunderbolt that Heraclitus said pilots all things. The bolt from
the blue that startled our primal ancestors into a new level of awareness. That brought the Frankenstein monster to life (in the movie, note, not the book).
A Renaissance Man in the genuine sense of the term, Joyce, like Leonardo, embraced all technologies, seeing them as extensions rather than limitations of the human. Technologies based in
electricity-the telegraph, telephone, television, film-fascinated him because they provided means
by which words and images moved through space and time. They suggested the tactile and gestural
quality that was missing in the conventional book. Many Wakies insist that had Joyce survived into
the 1950's he would have abandoned the book for the cinema. In the 1920's, these electric technologies were simply too undeveloped to incorporate (a good word, that!) structurally into the
book; instead Joyce had to be content merely to allude to them and employ their jargon ("closeup,"
"footage," "blackout," etc.) as part of that narrative thread which in the Wake is a history of communicating machines.
With Finnegans Wake, the novel as a genre, and perhaps the Book as a cultural artifact, came to
an end, both in the sense of full realization of its nature and of its demise. There was simply nowhere
to go after the Wake. And because no one knew what to make of this strange animal, it sank into relative obscurity at least as far as most of the world was concerned. It has slumbered like Dr. Frankenstein's monster waiting for the bolt of electricity that will shock him into existence or like the dead
Tim Finnegan in the popular ballad, fallen from a ladder and awaiting the accidental splash of
whiskey that will bring him back to rowdy, boisterous, Falstaffian life.
That electrical charge, the baptism in whiskey that will rouse the Wake to life, has finally arrived
a half century after Joyce's death. Its proper name is cyberspace, its nicknames are "Web" and
"Net," and the language it speaks is Hypertext.
Interestingly, when I ask what cyberspace is, respondents sound suspiciously like Camillo when
he was asked about his wooden theater or Joyce when he resorted to conundrums to explain what
the Wake was. One Webster (Webster: a cyberspatial philologist who uses the language of Hypertext
to cruise the World Wide Web; or perhaps: an early model cyberspace vehicle ) put it this way: "It's
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a place that's not really a place, but you can talk to people, learn things, buy stuff, enjoy yourself, or
just hang out bumping into things you don't expect. But everything's there. And it's fun!" More frequently I get the generic "Louis Armstrong/Jazz" response: "I really can't tell you; you just have to
be there." In the future we should expect "It's a Web thing. You wouldn't understand."
Despite these telling evasions, an operative definition of cyberspace does exist and has gained
wide currency in the past decade. William Gibson's account in his novel Neuromancer seems an
eerily exact description of Finnegans Wake. To Gibson, cyberspace is a "consensual hallucination"
that is "the simultaneous experience of time, space, and the flow of multidimensional, pan-sensory
data" (51). Cyberspace, like Finnegans Wake, radically changes our sense of what it means to "read."
People still debating whether anyone has really "read" Finnegans Wake are stuck in the old paradigm which understands reading as a sequential act of sign decoding yielding a coherent and stable
message. A reader of Finnegans Wake is more like a navigator moving experientially through simulacra, not with the intention of understanding what is going on or finding out what's going to
happen at the end, or of getting the "point," but with the aim of experiencing a hallucinatory ride,
"hanging out," getting lost in fortuitous forks in the labyrinth, taking an ecstatic flight through the
infinite caverns of memory in which the journey itself becomes the goal.
Such a momentous cultural transformation, however, is dependent on (while helping to effect)
changes in discourse. Hypertext, in its practical, utilitarian form, is a navigational tool that permits
efficient maneuvering through mountains of data. Its aim (for all technologies understood practically have goals) is to make the finding and getting of desired information swift and easy. It is the
computer's version of "working in layers." The top layer contains words or phrases which are
"hot," that is, capable, when clicked on by an electronic mouse, of exposing an underlying layer of
information connected specifically with that word or phrase. For example, in the paragraph above
is the line "an ecstatic flight through the infinite caverns of memory." As I wrote those words, I had
in mind the passage from St. Augustine's Confessions: "Behold in the plains, and caves, and caverns
of memory.. .I run, I fly; I dive on this side and that, as far as I can, and there is no end" (quoted in
Yates, 46). In the interests of space, and sensing the reader's flagging attention, I chose not to mention the connection. If, however, this were a hypertext document being read on a computer screen,
the words "ecstatic flight" would be "hot," colored red perhaps, and a curious reader could descend,
if she so chose, to the underlying layer to follow the link, and proceed even further, leaving Augustine and moving on to the history of mnemonic systems and then to related links having to do with
theology and western thought. And, if she desired to leave Hypertext in its practical mode and shift
into warp-speed Hypertext, she might follow a dizzying array of links that would recirculate her
back to Finnegans Wake and environs.
In its magical formulation Hypertext is not simply a link to related elements but potentially to
all information, all knowledge, everything that is. Theoretically, any hypertextualized passage is a
gateway to infinite associations. St. Augustine's discussion of memory connects with hundreds of
"nodes" having to do with theology, medievalism, religion, and each of these nodes spawns thousands of dendrites which in turn generate hundreds of thousands of connections until the whole
comes to took like the spidery network of veins in a human body.
(Infinity and the Body is Finnegans Wake in a nutshell. If the word "nutshell" were highlighted
here, one subtext in a constellation of subtexts would note its metamorphosis into "notshall" in the
Wake, and another would quote Hamlet, Act II sc. ii. "Oh God, I could be bounded in a nutshell and
count myself king of infinite space, were it not I have bad dreams." H.C. Earwicker dons his
nightcap, goes to bed and then to sleep and in his dreams counts himself king of infinite space.
Hypertext celebrates that which is tangential, beside the point, parenthetical).
The Renaissance magus believed that all information, all knowledge, all wisdom could be made
available to the human being if the mind were trained to receive such massive quantities of data.
Bruno devised a complicated "memory wheel" replete with 150 images drawn primarily from
mythic and astral sources as a kind of pictorial interface between the merely human mind programmed to forget by the culture into which it has fallen and a kind of super mind freed from

parochial shackles, exulting in total remembrance, a place that's not really a place and through
which the ecstatic pilot soars like a medieval theologian hanging out in the endless caverns of
memory.
Bruno's wheel, Camillo's Theater, the memory "ladders" of Raymond Lull, were all what we
would call today "graphical user interfaces," iconic "clearing houses" which not only project voyagers into the zone of infinite space, but also protects them from being overwhelmed by what they
are about to experience. Hypertext provides a series of "anchors" which help orient the navigator
as he moves through the great caves. In the Memory tradition, such anchors were known as "loci,"
niches, stations in the spectacular journey of the mental traveler.
Joyce invented his own version of Hypertext in Finnegans Wake. Anyone who has spent some
quality time in the book will testify that after an initial phase of complete bewilderment, something
miraculous happens. The navigator discovers that familiar pictures, places, and rhythms (exactly
what they are, however, is a matter of continual dispute) seem to recirculate in a way that makes a
strange kind of sense, the non-sense sense of the dream, a logic more intricate and interesting than
any logic from the daytime world, a logic emanating as much from mythos as logos, the combination of which generates "true stories," and which creates the giddy impression within the voyager
that he has seen something genuinely wonderful, revelational, the Whole Story, All That Is.
It was this kind of dream, no doubt, that Samuel Taylor Coleridge was having when he was
interrupted by a knock on the door by that famous person from Porlock. Mter the interruption,
Coleridge found that he had forgotten almost all of his vision and what he remembered was preserved in what he called "a fragment in a dream." It is the tale of Kubla Khan, the ruler of a magical
kingdom known as Xanadu, a word, which if highlighted, would evoke (among, many other things)
a famous film and one of the key architects of Hypertext itself. Xanadu is the name of Citizen Kane's
fabulous mansion filled with marvelous treasures from all over the world. It was none of these
priceless toys, however, that could unlock the secret of Kane's (and everybody else's) life; instead it
was a simple, humble, forgotten, apparently useless thing, a child's sled, the sign and symbol of no
less than everything, named Rosebud. It is no accident that Xanadu is also the name that the eccentric computer prophet, Ted Nelson (credited with coining the term Hypertext), gave to his vision of
a universal database containing all the information in the universe.
Xanadu: a place that is not a place but everything's there and you can learn stuff. Inelegant as
the netsurfer's description may be, it still manages to restate in its own bland terms the main features of the magical memory system-the accessibility (what cyberpilots call "downloading") of all
knowledge within a continually metamorphosing sensory matrix. This understanding of the matter,
of course, has been, is, and will be denounced by those whose role, like that of the chorus of elders
in Greek tragedies, is to insist that we are not gods nor were meant to be, that we can never know
everything, and that our job on earth is to recognize our limitations and do what is lawful. These
judges, recirculated in all their historical and mythic manifestations in the Wake, may wear the robes
of inquisitors searching out heresy or the three-piece business suits of managers devoted to the
"bottom line," but their function has always been the same: to disenchant, demythologize, remove
stories from stars, spirits from trees, giants from landscapes, to replace the contradictory, kaleidoscopic Big Story with a much smaller one whose chief claim to virtue is its simplicity, clarity, and
efficiency.
In her book on the art of memory, Yates reports that the Renaissance memory masters would
often invent dialogs between rationalists and magicians in which the logicians would cite the obscurity and pretentiousness of the memory system as evidence of its uselessness while the magician
would take final refuge in the claim that the enterprise was religious, a "miracle" or a "revelation."
In the end what mattered to the magus was not clarity, simplicity, efficiency, but the ecstatic multifoliate beholding of the Divine.
The religious dimensions of cyberspace with its language of "miracle" and "revelation" are at
present, of course, difficult to see. It is currently being navigated by pilots who were born into and
still use the rhetoric of the secular print and late capitalist culture, accounting for a great deal of its
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focus on getting and spending as well as its frequent bland and vapid utilitarian language. In a way it
could be seen as the electronic version of the Elizabethan fish-market, limitless space for the hawking
of wares. The mercantile ethic, however, is but one transparency in this multi-layered phenomenon,
necessary, of course, for an accurate representation of human life and thought in its infinite variety,
but decidedly minor in its present form. If cyberspace is to resemble more and more Finnegans
Wake, emphasis must be placed less on getting than experiencing. Knowledge, for example, should
no longer be a commodity but closer to what Plato thought it was, an eroticized expression of soul,
a transformation. In this world participants will help produce rather than passively consume texts.
And adventures in the endlessly branching landscape of cyberspace will be undertaken only incidentally in quest of a destination or goal; more often they will be done simply for the sake-as our
Webster might say-of just forking around.
The Wake is as important to the Web as the Web is to the arousal of the sleeping Wake. Remembering Finnegan, we are called once again (only this time, consensually rather than individually) to
re-collect the letters out of the litter in order to invent a new hypertextual, carnalized "allforabit"
whose language will necessarily be more fractured, decentered, polyglottal, energetic, intense, ripe
for new and unexpected uses, as it was when Shakespeare found it in the late sixteenth century and
as Joyce reimagined it for the cyberspatial future.
Remembering Finnegan we recognize that the central failing of our time is one of forgetfulness, and not just forgetfulness of facts and figures but of everything important. Cyberspace, like
other immense memory systems of the past-the magical books of Bruno; the wooden playhouse
of Camillo; the plays of Shakespeare performed within the great globe itself, the colossal tripartite
structure that is Dante's Divina Commedia; the Bible with its encyclopedic sweep of everything
from genesis to the apocalypse-is first and foremost an awakener to recollection. And like those
systems, it arrogantly presumes that entrance into its space amounts to a potential encounter with
everything that is, and that such an encounter is, well, as our Webster said (employing what might
be called the diminished language resources of the Victorian Age of Chaos about to return to the
hieroglyphic language of the Age of the Gods), fun.
Remembering Finnegan, we learn that the central question is always the same every where and
in every age. Are you having fun again? Are you in the funhouse, cave, or carnival, where words
become flesh again? Where everything beheld is seen as if for the first time again? Where everything
done is yet the same play again?
Finally, remembering Finnegan we re-Joyce to dis-cover that cyberspace is nothing new.
Beneath its manifold layers and transparencies, behind the cacophony of multi-lingual noise ("e'erawhere in this whorl would ye hear sich a din again?"), is the genuine primal scene, the hushed witnessing by initiates who have come into a dark, enclosed space where they behold something phenomenal: a pageant of animals, layer upon layer of them, painted on voluptuously undulating walls
to give the impression that they are animate, in motion, ensouled.
It is here, in this place that is not a place, at this moment of religious miracle and revelation
when the phenomenal world metamorphoses into what Joyce calls the "funanimal" world, that we
begin to learn how to read the unread and unreadable book.
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THE SURF TALKS

then she's again looking up the beach for her mother
taking off running to tell her what's happened

That rocking off-balance drowziness

and I'm alone at the tide

of a day spent looking at water

Maybe she was moving, I think

the curl and crush of the waves

as the beach ran out from under her

so cold it makes your feet hurt

maybe she was moving

My nearly-seven-year old

She could've been gone, man

had asked me to hold her hand

In that moment before God

so to play among the waves reaching up the beach

as I complained how much I dislike being a parent

You can do it, I say

being married

and soon she's playing with another little girl

being 40

running and giggling away from the tide

being me

then stomping on the foam

she could've been sucked out to sea

The other kid's mother is standing nearby

gone

I'm standing nearby

like never again

watching what I take to be pelicans dive

What's wrong with me?

and clusters of indeterminate birds

Isn't there some

planing out over the ocean's surface

automatic parent response that's

Then I notice they're down

supposed to kick in?

white spray swirling around them

And after

She's only fallen, I note

some transcendent recognition of the precious fragility of

and start walking slowly
as though my attitude held sway over
the forces of nature

human life
that inspires respect for the awesomeness of the mystery
and

She's not going anywhere, I think

"spiritual" how-to books that land one on television?

assessing the situation

Sentiment

I see the sea receding over and under them

all sentiment

my girl splashing, spluttering, struggling to get to her knees

I'm too busy trying to teach her lessons

while I take a few steps towards her

make her a decent human being

That's playin' in the waves for ya

being annoyed

She coughs, obviously from water down her throat

moving behind a mist

I see the red-cheeked panic in her face

I should be squeezing her in my arms

the out-stretched arms, the cry

glad and thankful for her life

and I saunter over and pull her to her feet

crying with my wife tears of grace

You're all right, I say

praising God's goodness

You're soaked, but you're all right

and instead I just keep thinking

Then she jumps away from me

She wasn't going anywhere

I don't wanna do that anymore, she says

She'd only fallen down

OK, well hang a minute and catch your breath
I see her little body relax for a second
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religious faith and political office-an illicit connection?
Robert Benne

The religious expressiveness of Vice-Presidential nominee Senator Joseph Lieberman has
caused quite a stir. It seems to have been the stick
that broke the camel's back. After all, at least
three out of the four candidates for President
and Vice-President have talked openly of their
faith and how it relates to their politics. Dick
Cheney seems to be the only reticent one of the
four when it comes to expressing his faith in
public. Certainly President Clinton has not been
bashful about his faith. Indeed, commentator
Mark Silk has suggested that Clinton has been
the most religion-friendly President since Eisenhower, and perhaps of all time.
But Lieberman's openness and assertiveness about how his religious practices and convictions affect his political life seem to have stimulated a major discussion. In general, conservatives have welcomed this, with some provisos.
A recent issue of The Weekly Standard was entitled "Faith Talk." While its editors lamented the
religiosity and self-righteousness involved in
some such expressions, they welcomed the more
overt role for religion in public life. The editors
of the evangelical website Religion Today appreciated Lieberman's public religious articulations
but worried that they are a strategy to revive a
"religious left."
However, most liberals and secularists
among the elite were less than welcoming of
Lieberman's public professions. The AntiDefamation League, the American Civil Liberties Union, and Americans United for Separation
of Church and State called upon him to cease
and desist, worrying that appeals along religious
lines violate the American ideal. Our local newspaper, The Roanoke News, applauded the cautions that those organizations raised while at the

same time it appreciated Lieberman's elaboration of the sources of the personal values that
might affect his decision-making. But the same
newspaper chastised him for "substituting noble
motive for reasoned argument as the justification for the positions he takes," as if religion has
nothing to add but motive to policy formation.
The liberal columnist Robert Reno was contemptuous of Lieberman's "oozed religiosity."
He raised the alarm that "stuffing more religion
into politics" will lead inevitably to sectarian
conflict and blood-letting.
Most of the public conversation about religion in political life has been pretty muddled and
confused, some of it downright wrong-headed.
The interaction between religion and politicsand politics and religion, for that matter-is a
complex phenomenon upon which I would like
to shed some light. I have written extensively on
this issue in my book entitled The Paradoxical
Vision-a Public Theology for the Twenty-first
Century. This current conversation gives me a
chance to focus on one particular facet of a
highly complicated subject matter, that is, the
ways that public political figures connect their
religious convictions to their political life. Further, we can reflect on some of the standards for
better or worse ways of connecting faith and
politics on the part of public office holders.
1.

First, let us clear up some confusions. The
case of Lieberman-of an individual political
figure connecting his faith with his office-can
easily be distinguished from church-state issues.
Unfortunately, the "separation of church and
state" phrase is such an omnipresent mantra that
it is used in all-purpose ways, even to stricturing
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an individual like Lieberman. Church-state sep- civil religion, showed how every newly elected
aration refers to institutions and their relations. President feels compelled to rely on "God-talk"
While there is good reason for keeping those to legitimate, bless, sometimes criticize, and
two institutions separate (no established church, often inspire the nation to higher achievements
for instance), there is no constitutional or prac- of justice. Sometimes the inaugural addresses are
tical way to keep individuals-even public boiler-plate, but at other times they embody
office-holders-from exercising their religious profound religious insights for the nation and its
beliefs as a basis for their political actions. It is trajectory. Who cannot admire the deep relitotally misplaced to wheel out the slogan of gious wisdom in the inaugural addresses of
church-state separation to try to silence indi- Washington, Lincoln and many other thoughtful
vidual believers.
Presidents? Obviously these are positive cases of
Indeed, the issue of political officials con- office holders expressing their religious convicnecting their faith and their work is a subspecies tions in public.
of the general subject of religion and politics.
Religion and politics constitutes a much larger 11.
field of interest, including church-state relations.
So, the question is not so much whether the
But the field of religion and politics also includes religion of office holders will interact with their
inquiry into the religiously-informed voting pat- politics, but rather how. We should add the qualterns of believers, the programs and actions of ifier that the office holder has to be serious about
the thousands of non-church but yet religious his or her religion, as Lieberman seems to be.
voluntary associations, and of course how public There are indeed office holders who either are
figures connect their faith and work. All these not seriously religious or hold their religious
actions examined in such studies are actions that convictions in a completely different realm than
are constitutionally protected. Further, they their political activities. Such seems to have been
would be impossible to bar from use because the case with John F. Kennedy, who assured
they issue from deeply held but often private those who were worried about his Catholic
convictions that would be impossible to identify upbringing that his faith would make no differor limit. Religion and politics as a field of ence whatsoever to his political actions as a
interest also includes the ways that politics- prospective President. No doubt many other
including the judiciary-affect religious life, not political figures make no connection between
only in its institutional but also in its individual their faith-if they have any-and their politics.
However, for those who take their religion seridimensions.
So religion and politics will interact, even ously there can be no separation of their faith
the religion and politics of political figures. Cer- and politics, though there certainly ought to be
tainly the connection of religion and politics by a distinction.
The great religious traditions-Judaism,
political figures has been evident throughout the
ages. Plato's philosopher king was essentially a Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism-provide
religiously inspired ruler. The Christian prince comprehensive visions of life. For the dominant
of the Middle Ages was expected to protect traditions in America-Judaism and ChrisChristian convictions and practices. The tianity-God is the God of all, not just the prifounders of our country certainly expressed reli- vate places of one's own heart. God is a God of
gious convictions in our founding documents. history. The Biblical narrative, and the reflection
One does not have to look far to detect the upon it in both Judaism and Christianity, prounderlying Judea-Christian belief in the sanctity vides wisdom about the origin and destiny of the
of the individual person in our nation's guaran- world, about the character of history and its
tees of "inalienable rights." The political unfolding, about human nature and its predicaphilosopher Glen Tinder has located the ment, about human salvation, about our callings
"exalted individual" as the spiritual center of as human beings, and about human moral conWestern politics, adhered to and expressed by duct in the world. Each item of religious wisdom
has political implications, though it may well be
many political exemplars of our tradition.
Robert Bellah, in his study of American indirect and debatable. A whole vision of human
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flourishing in the world is borne by these traditions.
These traditions then involve far more than
just motivation, though they do involve that.
Secularists are willing to allow for religious
motivation but they would like those so motivated to be quiet about it. Further, they allow no
real content-religious and moral principles
growing out of those traditions-to become
operative in political life since they have bought
the secularist argument that religion is irrational
and arbitrary. Therefore, the content of religion
ought to remain private. If it doesn't, as Reno
argued, it will lead to irrational and irreconcilable conflicts.
But such a judgment simply cannot hold.
Without the religious and moral content of the
Jewish and Christian traditions, there would
have been no Declaration of Independence, Revolutionary War, Constitution, abolition movement, prohibition movement, civil rights movement, as well as no current lively debates over
abortion, euthanasia, sex education, foreign
policy, and the employment of faith-based organizations to get the work of our society done. It
is true that sometimes the religious and moral
content for these items was filtered through the
language of the Enlightenment or some other
less overtly religious ideology, but nevertheless
the fundamental notions come from the religious traditions.
There is little doubt, then, that public office
holders who are seriously religious will connect
their faith and their politics. Lieberman's religious expressiveness is not at all extraordinary.
However, that said, there remains the question
of what are the better or worse ways of making
the connection. There are ample cases of poor
or even worrisome connections.
ut.

The first kind of bad connection could be
termed the instrumental. By this I mean that religious concepts or practices are simply used to
sanctify or legitimate the public official's own
ambition or ideology. Religious principles are
not given an integrity of their own; they are
simply used for the politician's own purposes,
be those purposes personal or ideological. In
some extreme cases, dangerous demagogues use
religion to enhance their own power. When an

ex-communist like Milosevic in Serbia wraps
himself in the symbols of Orthodoxy to maintain and extend his own power, we have a demagogic use of religion. The instrumentalizing of
religious principles and practices are not always
so extreme. Religious conservatives and liberals
have long used verses from the Bible to prooftext favorite policies that have no necessary connection to those verses. Conservatives have used
biblical imagery of evil to legitimate anti-communism. Liberals have used biblical passages to
reinforce their preferred welfare policies. President Clinton has used the practices of confession
and absolution to defend himself in the midst of
his various skirmishes. Instead of keeping such
practices private where their authenticity would
be much more credible, he stages public events
that promote his own political welfare.
The temptations of instrumentalizing religion for political purposes are manifold. As
political figures use religion it is quite likely that
their motives run the continuum from worthy to
base, with most in between. But the crass instrumentalization of religion is evident enough in
the modern world to warrant the call for reticence in the use of religion. Those who have
protested Lieberman's eager use of religion have
a point. Religion can easily be corrupted by
reducing it to an instrument for other purposes.
Another hazard for political figures using
religion in their political activities is what could
be called the direct line use. By this I mean that a
simple, direct line is drawn from a religious principle to a particular policy. Our local newspaper
rightly criticized Lieberman for such a misstep.
Citing the commandment to honor one's father
and mother, Lieberman invoked that injunction
to support the Democrats' proposal to add a prescription drug benefit to Medicare. A simple
line was drawn from one to the other when in
fact the movement from one to the other was far
from simple or direct. Liebermann was rightly
criticized for such a simplistic use of a religious
precept.
IV.

A far more persuasive use of religious principles is indirect. Most useable religious principles are of a high level of generality. "Love thy
neighbor." "Do justice and mercy." ''All humans
are created in the image of God." "Thou shalt

not steal." They provide basic moral presumptions of a high level of generality. They rarely
issue forth directly and simply into specific policies. There are many steps to negotiate as one
moves from those high-level, general principles
to specific policies. Persons with the same core
beliefs, persons of good will and intelligence,
part ways as they negotiate the many steps from
the religious principle to the concrete policy.
That is why many Christian persons with the
same core religious and moral beliefs can disagree on specific policies. Sincere Christians
inhabit both sides of the political divide on most
issues. That fact does not mean that their religious convictions are irrelevant; it simply means
that they move from general principle to specific
policies along different trajectories. It also might
mean that they order their principles along a different scale of priority.
One might think of the movement from
core religious and moral principles to specific
policy as one of transversing a number of concentric circles. At the center stand the core biblical principles. But those core principles, general as they are, must be given more specificity
by intermediate guidance principles. Does doing
justice, for example, mean affirmative action or
equality of opportunity? When one begins to
answer that question, one draws upon different
philosophical conceptions of justice, on one's
assessment of human nature, on the role of disincentives and incentives in public policy, and a
host of other considerations, including the question of feasibility. The best arguments start from
solid religious premises and persuasively move
through a number of sub-arguments to concrete
public policy. There certainly are better and
worse kinds of arguments, though we naturally
judge those arguments through partisan eyes.
There is little doubt that seriously religious
political figures not only are motivated to do
good in politics, but at their best also operate
from fundamental-though general-religious
principles. As those principles move toward concrete policy though, they necessarily include
many other sorts of other judgments that are not
biblical or even religious. Contrary to some secularist objections, though, there is no reason
why the full argument-from religious premise
to specific policy-should not be made public.
Religious political figures have as much right to
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articulate publicly the basis of their political
judgments as do secular figures. It's just that
there has to be a certain amount of sophistication and humility about the complexity of the
argument.
Let me add several provisos here. My
emphasis on indirectness does not mean that all
policies deserve respect as they move from the
general to the specific. Some indeed represent
inferior movements that must be ruled out. One
cannot, for example, begin with the principle of
the sacrality of each individual before God and
wind up with a racist policy. One cannot hold
the commandment against killing and blithely
take life at its beginning and ending. So not
"everything goes" in this indirect approach. The
very religious principles themselves rule out certain policies.
Another proviso. This emphasis on indirectness does not rule out a direct and prophetic
response to certain obvious evils on the basis of
rather simple biblical principles. When the Nazis
declared many sorts of people to be subhuman
and then proceeded to treat them that way, there
was little need on the part of courageous religious and political figures to go through complex and indirect arguments. A simple and
resounding "no" was the best response. Biblical
principles demanded such simplicity. Certain
obvious goods and evils should elicit simple but
passionate responses on the part of seriously religious political figures. However, most policies
do not exhibit such clear qualities of good and
evil.
A robust connection between the political
actor's religious faith and his or her public
actions is certainly not an illicit one. But as in
the case of most profound issues, the exercise of
religion in politics by the political actor is a complex one that needs careful consideration. Perhaps these reflections may add a bit to such consideration.
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amazingly grave reflections

Charles Vandersee

Dear Editor:
I was glad Moebie was out of town much
of last summer, and that I myself was away the
rest of the time, since when we parted in June
our normal incommensurability had seemed
magnified. Moebie is a student of contemporary
cultural practices, which I tell her means monitoring matters of short shelf-life: transitory
gurus and celebrities, trash-talk chat rooms, sitcoms succumbing on arrival, and so forth.
Whereas I like to read 19th-century novels, large
and dense, like the desserts in midscale restaurants called "Death by Chocolate."
"Who makes these rules?" Moebie had
asked, as we parted. "And what exactly is the
process?" She was trying to get a grasp, and I had
merely been grousing, after attending two
memorial services in three days. Each service, I
told her, had "Amazing Grace," in one case by
the local choir called Black Voices, and in the
other case from the Presbyterian hymnal. I like
"Amazing Grace," except for the "wretch like
me" part, and of course everybody likes
·~azing Grace," but why does every funeral at
our moment have to include it?
Moebie, in her professional capacity, tunes
in to school massacre funerals on TV. She too
saw a pattern. "They do always sing 'Amazing
Grace,"' she said, and I could virtually see her
virtual thinkpad clicking behind her eyes. "Why
do they do this? Who exactly makes this rule,
and how is it enforced?" My two examples were
serving as confirmation.
"Why does everybody below a certain level
of society eat Big Macs and drink dreadful lite
flavorless American beers?" I nearly blurted that

out. Everybody does it because everybody does
it-it's as simple as that. Or, less simply, somebody saw somebody doing it, and figured everybody does it, so started doing it. Until somebody
gets tired of it, or sees somebody doing something else. Nothing could be plainer or simpler
or clearer. A widely-held misconception says
that advertising has something to do with it, but
you never hear people doing something because
an ad told them to. Ads exist merely because corporations have advertising budgets. Money must
be spent.
My silences always peeve her, though I
keep telling her this is ponder time. I could see
that "Amazing Grace" was taking us into the
dangerous intersection of religion and culture.
You don't want to go there. Drivers run red
lights, and no camera films the crime.
One red light in this instance is the highly
specialized theology of ''Amazing Grace," with
that "hour I first believed." Generally speakihg,
belief is not something you hadn't one hour and
had the next; it's a process during which the
Holy Spirit has been gaining your attention
gradually, sometimes subliminally, rather than
suddenly pulling you back from a precipice.
Even the "born again" metaphor concerns
process; your body, if you're a woman, wasn't
svelte one day and stuffed to bursting the next.
How did this specialized theology get to be so
popular in death areas of the nation?
"Nobody is making this rule," I finally said,
gently. "There is no ecclesiastical clearing house
that says funerals in the pre- and post-millennium decades have to include 'Amazing Grace."'
"It happens," I said. "Stuff happens."
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This is the worst thing you can virtually say
to an analyst of culture, no matter how candid
and virtuous. It must have been too early in
summer, the flaccid brain not yet braced by ginsand-tonic. Nothing just "happens." A whole
book, The Tipping Point, by Malcolm Gladwell,
on how nothing just happens, has been gaining
the attention of people stressed for explanations.
But another horrible ecclesiastical example had
just struck me. As summer started I had been in
conversation with a colleague who attends one
of the more conservative local churches, a man
who has a great deal of contact with students.
He had lately talked with a mildly offended student, a worshiper at his church, who wondered
aloud to him why the music was so, well, oldfashioned.
He had not thought about this, but her
comment made him face the music. He studied
the worship resources being used in this congregation which relies heavily on praise songs. He
was astounded to discover that, indeed, most of
the selections were old. They dated from the
1970s. Where was the stuff to suit current
tastes? No wonder his student felt ill at ease!
Should I bring this up with Moebie? I could
imagine her question: "Who actually decides
when a particular style of music in church needs
changing? What exactly is the process?" She has
a very imperfect sense of how public religion, or
for that matter religiosity, operates. Over the
years I have never succeeded in clarifying this.
She is much interested, from her quasi-scientific
distance, in religious causation, thresholds, marginality, centers and borders-all those
precipices of the age.
Why do people do what they do? Why are
a bunch of people always doing the same thing,
and then not? As in the old quip: "Nobody goes
to that restaurant anymore; it's too crowded."
She thinks we have to find out. When I see
"Death by Chocolate" on a restaurant menu it
gladdens my heart, or tiramisu. Soon these will
be gone, replaced by who knows what. Meanwhile, the rich dense 19th-century American
novel-The Portrait of a Lady, The House of
Mirth, Sister Carrie, The Song of the Lark-you
always have with you.
Why did the 19th century linger, culturally,
till about 1915, the year of The Song of the Lark,
about opera? Nobody knows, though they
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blame the Great War. But if the War proved the
failure of 19th-century culture and politics,
shouldn't there have been a reversion to the 18th
century? Why would people have entered the
uncertain 20th?
History is fascinating, to anyone with an
interesting mind, because we seldom really
know why anything happens. We excitedly
ponder and dig, and come up with new
accounts, tweaking the old ones, and if we now
label them "revisionist" we have the additional
fun of infuriating the rich dense right wing,
which always wants still more money for itself,
and further prolongation of the 19th century.
How money and mindlessness go together, in
some paroxysmal symbiosis, will probably never
be explained. Why do the heathen rage, and
imagine a vain thing?
Moebie was being persistent. "Is the World
Council of Churches responsible?" she asked.
"Is it the Ecumenical Movement?" The way she
intoned these, I saw the word "Inc." on the end
of each. As if some gigantic corporate merger
had actually managed to regularize business
practices in every one of the round earth's imagined corners and was a model for religion.
Yet as everyone knows, bribery, baksheesh,
payoffs, special arrangements-whatever you
call it-differs from place to place. If you actually had a corporate song, as they do in Japan, it
would be sung differently in Bayreuth and
Nashville. Why suppose that some central entity
is responsible for "Amazing Grace" at every
American public funeral? The Presbyterian
hymnal of 1990, I could not help noticing, prints
the hymn phonetically in several Native languages: Kiowa, Creek, Choctaw, Cherokee, and
Navaho. This is really true. Thus there would be
"Amazing Grace" funerals Moebie is not
watching, but by which her suspicion of some
mysterious world order would be fortified.
"Is the World Council of Churches responsible?" Did she know what she was asking? All
the rich dense people call the Council utterly
irresponsible, and turn blue with anger. I
decided to ask her a question, while we were on
the subject of death. Why was it impossible for
me to understand whole communities in the
South needing to pray before football games,
and why was it impossible for them to understand me? Wasn't this proof of death of some

kind-death of a sense of national unity, death
of imagination, death of civility, death of religion itself when requiring such aggressive and
tacky means?
Even right-wing columnist Cal Thomas is
opposed to football prayers-"as incompatible
as playing football inside a church building or
piping an NFL playoff game into the sanctuary
to persuade people to come to church on the
Sunday of a big contest." Woof!
"You don't know," said Moebie, "what
these football prayers are like. Nobody outside
the Deep South and West South knows." "Newspapers," she said, "do not tell us their contents."
"They may not be as bad as you think," she went
on. "Or," she said, "these football prayers may
be just one prayer, the Lord's Prayer, week after
week, a Jew addressing the Jewish God."
"Also," said Moebie, "we know too little
about vibes." "Prayer," she said, "may in subtle
ways alter the human body, just as good thoughts
in a generic secular sense do. So people in a stadium full of people are not necessarily communicating with God, but instead making sounds
that make them healthy." "In which case," she
said, "people who do not have a God, or the
locally prevailing God, can still join in, because
nothing religious is going on."
I wished she would not keep talking about
things we don't know, that the media could start
telling us. It makes the 21st century sound as
mystical and uninformed as any previous illiterate century. Newsmagazines could print in
boxes the actual texts of prayers. Newspapers
could interview funeral arrangers to see how
they choose music. TV programs could tackle
some of those liminal issues; if your conscience
was on the border, for example-the very
verge-of dissenting from some prayer or other,
should you fudge it, as Jehovah did Sodom?
Wasn't that the wishy-washy incident when first
the city is to be demolished, but saved if only 50
people are righteous? And eventually God is
negotiated down to ten? How do people like
God decide when something is just too much, or
not too much? Couldn't TV conduct interviews
with real people, also academics, to inform us?
When I said some of this to Moebie, she
reacted with summer disgust. I saw she truly
needed a glacier, as I was seeking canyons. "You
might as well do it yourself," she said. "Just look

at remote Southern newspapers online, or phone
school football offices, and request texts of
prayers faxed." "This," she said, "is the information era. Information is out there."
The obvious rejoinder to this was: "Who
has the time?" Also: "Hey, you yourself could
get on the phone and call people arranging
school massacre funerals. Ask them how and
why 'Amazing Grace' came to their attention,
and whether they think it's somehow obligatory.
Do arrangers assume that from watching TV all
parents now feel there is only this ~azing' way
of rendering American grief, and that hearts will
be incomplete if not doing what everybody else
does, or what?"
I did not say this. It did seem to me, though,
that we were on the border, or precipice or
threshold, of something. Shouldn't we as vague
readers be letting editors and ombudsmen know
precisely of the information gaps we perceive?
The media are, after all, media. They stand in
the way between us and the information that we
don't have time to go out and get.
Football prayers could consist of any
number of things, and the media could go out
and get these. Maybe people pray not for
clunking the other team but for good sportsmanship. Maybe they pray for parents, that moms
become not the usual Texas cheerleader moms,
bashing each other to death. Maybe they pray
for rain. Maybe they pray that football will reaffirm for players and consumers, one and all, the
essentials of American competition, thus
strengthening the community covenant, and
chain-store corporate revenue several states
away. Maybe prayers vary from stadium to stadium, from public square to public square, as it
were.
Maybe they don't even pray to Jesus, but
to a Higher Power. If, of course, they prayed to
Jesus to show Jews and Muslims the perversity
of their ways, this would hardly be defensible,
but maybe they have coded language that says
the same thing without saying it, cleverly unperceived by some Supreme Court. If so, this is
worth knowing. Do they ever revert to 1970s
language, or are they conscious that a Higher
Ear would naturally be as up to date as theirs?
"You see," said Moebie, "the genius of
summer is the opportunity for clarity." "We
pause," she said, "to think things out, in terms

of what we know we don't know and therefore
know what gratifications we await."
I pointed out what she should have known,
that the media never change, except to add color
and brevity, and that therefore we would never
soon have our gratifications fulfilled.
And as if to prove my point the summer air
turned out to be full of fires, from glacier
country to lizardy deserts. Clarity was being
challenged. As a new season of football prayers

and school violence settled in upon us in Sep\
tember, like ash from arsonists, we still were the
same people as before, though briefly distracted
from our ignorance by the mysteriously religious
and opportune language of campaigners, now
that everybody was doing it.
From Dogwood, yours faithfully,

WHAT GOES BY

Trains go by, teaming through our tents
at night. Many people in cars go by on 101,
wishing they were anywhere but where
they are. The ranger goes by in his cart,
refusing another cup of coffee. Pelicans
go by in flocks, heaving their wings.

Waves go by, raising their dead.
Surfers, dolphins, children go by; they know
why they are here. Fog goes by, sun goes by,
even the moon. Deep in the night,
a rabbit burrows all in secret under our heads.
In our dreams, cottontails go by, go by.

-El Capitan State Beach

Paul Willis
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the scurvy principle

James Combs

We first heard the cat crying on a spring
morning-the mournful whine of a sick feline.
He was indeed ill, emaciated and in pain, but he
seemed to trust us and ate a little. We opined that
he a knew a cat "ranch" populated by a tribe of
tiger, and that we, the big cats, would care for
him. And we did, culminating in a trip to the veterinarian, shots and medicine and special care.
For a while, it looked like he might pull through,
and we even gave him a name: "Scurvy". But he
was too ill with a feline disease, and died quietly
on his pallet on a Saturday afternoon. We buried
Scurvy in our cat graveyard, and amidst the usual
gloom, consoled ourselves with the "we did
what we could" balm. A sad but not unprecedented event that animal lovers, or even those
who just take pity on hurt and stray animals,
have experienced all too many times. An isolated
and small episode to be remembered as only
another failed attempt to alleviate small sufferings.
But it wasn't. Scurvy's appearance and disappearance coincided with an astonishing array
of somehow related events. The antibiotic
intended for him cured the bad eye of another
stray cat; we were unexpectedly asked to take in
an abused cat; all three had names beginning
with "S"; we seemed all at once the center of the
Feline Kingdom. We were in the midst of selling
the old family house, left to us by my last aunt,
who as a college student (and congenital cripple)
in the 1920's, I rediscovered, had acquired the
nickname "Scurvy". I was in the middle of
putting together personal and genealogical stuff
that had accumulated and found pictures of my
first cat, Bubbles, who died suddenly when I was
six or seven and had a profound affect on my
religious views, which had been revived with this
cat death. And so on: one thing seemed to lead

to another, and what seemed a mere incident
became interwoven with serendipitous and suggestive occurrences, and kept alive the sense
that, in some way I did not fully understand, the
death of a stray cat was a meaningful event, and
even more puzzling, part of a larger mosaic of
memories, occurrences, and attributions that
had become memorable. But what did it all
mean, if anything?
Perhaps the easiest explanation of such suddenly memorable episodes is to characterize
them by one of my "continualist" principles:
things happen in bunches, except when they
don't. It was just a fluke. But perhaps that is too
easy. Many people tell me they have had similar
experiences that defy easy explanation. Or take
those related categories of experience which
have the same perplexing effect on us. All of us
have had the deja vu moment: haven't I lived
through this before? It is a strange feeling to witness something unfold exactly as you remember
it, even though it is happening now and couldn't
possibly have happened before. Or could it? Or
consider the "small world" encounter. I was
once hiking in a remote spot on the Cornish
coastal path and happened across a hiker who
turned out to be from a nearby city, knew friends
and relatives, and so forth, leading us to murmur
the only thing you can say, "Small world". (Psychologist Stanley Milgram and others have
studied the small world phenomenon, discovering that the most gregarious and otherdirected amongst us do indeed know a lot of
people, and link us to the larger world through
the now well-known "six degrees of separation".)
Social observers have long pondered the
ways in which human beings are connected to
one another, and whether we live in discrete and
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largely private existences or in a vast interconnected network of relationships. Their explanations recount the logic of small world encounters, noting that such events are not nearly as
random or rare as we might think. Psychologists
can account for the deja vu experience as an
example of similitude, since what we live
through is often quite similar to something forgotten or repressed and now seems to be occurring again. But explaining the rhythm of things
is a bit trickier. Why are we suddenly aware of a
conjunction of things that seem unrelated but in
the next moment appear to be of a piece?
The great psychologist C.G. Jung once
wrote a much-reprinted article entitled "Synchronicity," which tried very carefully (Jung was
always accused of mysticism) to make some
sense out of what appeared to be coincidence
and chance but exhibited a kind of temporal and
spatial rhythm. Anticipating the "tao of physics"
argument, he studied both the I Ching and
modern physics, and wondered about "acausal
orderliness" and "synchronistic events" that are
"acts of creation in time." (The philosopher C.S.
Peirce had also speculated about chance as the
first category of existence, a real constituent of
things that "pours in at every avenue of sense.")
Yet such moments in time are not random, but
rather a conjunction of events that unite psychic
and physical reality in a chance and sudden
meaning. Perhaps we do not grasp why chance
began the connection of unrelated relatedness,
and are clueless to its meaning, but we are aware
that something has happened we did not anticipate. Why the connectivity? Do we come into
such experiences putting things together that
have no connection, confound our explanatory
powers, and threaten our sense of causal order?
I suspect it is because we find them so
intriguing. We are after all creatures of habit,
who live our lives within the confines of social
conventions and routines that order our lives. If
we are reasonably healthy and prosperous, we
come to expect and enjoy that ordered universe.
But occasionally something happens to give us a
rare glimpse into stranger venues outside the ken
of the quotidian-acausal connections, deja vu,
small-world encounters, and more profoundly,
mystical experiences ranging from "returnfrom-death" accounts to stigmata. Something as
common as synchronicity and as unaccountable
as stigmata goads us out of our complacency by
putting us in touch with the extraordinary.
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Everything from Scurvy's appearance to
bleeding hands and feet intrigues us with their
defiance of conventional wisdom or ingrained
habit or physical law, with their participation in
a world outside of what we know and expect.
(Television's The X Files has run a long way on
every possible variation of the bizarre and occult
and inexplicable, from spontaneous combustion
to the mysterious goings-on in Area 51.)
Our intrigue with strange experience must
surely be whetted in the popular mind by the
news from contemporary physics. The layperson
can only conclude that physics is merging with
metaphysics when they read of antimatter and
superstrings and extra dimensions and decoherence and dark matter. Einstein's famous quip
about God not playing dice with the universe
may now seem an archaic residue of deterministic law, since it is easy to draw the conclusion
that the universe is a cosmological crapshoot.
And yet: scientific theory at this mindboggling
level of generality and innovation is reaching
beyond its empirical grasp. At this level of mystery, the limits of our imagination threaten to
strain our linguistic resources. (A modern physicist once remarked that the universe is not only
stranger than we imagine, but rather stranger
than we can imagine.) At the level of "meaning
physics," we are breathtakingly close to theology, and it is no wonder that the eminent
physicist Steven Hawking openly uses the concept of God.
Which returns us to Scurvy. Ordinary folks
experiencing an inexplicable time of synchronicity are in a tinier, but no less puzzling,
quandary than theoretical physicists. The scientists tell us that nothing in nature is at rest. Since
our minds are part of nature, the human capacity
for understanding is never at rest either. This is
no doubt because we are constantly faced with
the appearance of things beyond our limited
capacity to understand. Our great ability, and
curse, is our gift for the arrangement of the
world into symbolic patterns. Indeed, at this
stage of social inquiry, to my mind the most
remarkable and insightful work is the effort to
understand us as "the symbol-using animal", or
as the late Ernest Becker put it, homo poeta, the
being that strives above all for meaning. The
person puzzling over a deja vu moment is united
with the theoretical physicist in trying to figure
things out. Scurvy's appearance and conjunction
with a web of curiously related events calls for

the resources of language-metaphor, in partic- sees the humanities and sciences as components
ular-no less than naming a physical phenom- of general human inquiry, exemplified in the
enon a "superstring" or "wormhole" (a term academic core of "arts and sciences." As Jacob
dramatized by Star Trek!). It is no doubt common Bronowski and many others in that tradition
to explain synchronicity in terms of destiny, fate, have pointed out, the arts and sciences may be
or the innumerable versions of pathos or ani- different in modes of expression, but they both
mism, in all cases utilizing against the dearth of have their origin in imagination. Episodes of
explanatory power the immense fund of human synchronicity and images of superstrings have in
symbolicity. Laypersons and physicists are in the common the whetting of the imagination and
same small and rocking boat of knowledge, the pursuit of questions through their respective
trying to come up with ways of knowing what and accumulative ways of inquiry. They are both
the hell is going on. We all have logical and motivated by the mystery of life rooted in the
rational abilities that let us use reason, and are fact that our knowledge at any point and in any
able to gather and use factual evidence. But these field is vastly exceeded by the potential knowlactivities cannot in themselves adduce meaning. edge in our environment. In that sense, the arts
That requires a further step, the discovery and and sciences are united in their humane purpose,
characterization of quality. The Scurvy incident which is the place of man in the universe. Popand infinite physical dimensions make sense to ular experience such as serendipitous felines and
us when we find their qualitative meaning. And disciplinary experience such as theoretical
that can only be done by an imaginative leap that physics point us towards similar questions and
seeks understandings beyond the reach of logic answers: what does it all mean? In that sense, all
and evidence. Finding meaning in a stray eat's inquiries ultimately face and utilize aesthetic crideath and the eventual death of the universe put teria of knowledge. This points to the idea that
us in the realm of aesthetics, finding meaning in our experience is ultimately cultural, since we
experience through symbolic qualification. In define situations as symbolic and fashion
this sense, both the common mysteries of human answers in the resources of language. (In that
experience and the cosmic mystery of the fate of regard, I recently read a book entitled Nonsense,
the cosmos are ultimately aesthetic questions, by an English professor named Susan Stewart, in
expressed in metaphors of qualitative signifi- which she recounts the many varieties of literary
cance. Synchronicities and superstrings help to nonsense: reversals and inversions, play with
locate us in some form of qualitative space and boundaries and infinites, simultaneity; I was
time.
struck by how much nonsense sounded like postJohn Dewey wrote long ago rather well Einsteinian physics, with both at the frontiers of
about "art as experience." But much of what he knowledge, literary and physical.)
said was actually about experience as art. At the
Scurvy, frolicking in the Celestial Cat
highest level of abstraction, the theoretical Meadow, must find such considerations pretty
physicist must put his or her knowledge in the amusing. But Scurvy, you must try to understand
context of human sensibility that includes not us humans. We fret over meaning so much that
only explanatory language such as superstrings we find it in flowers in crannied walls and mute
but also something of the wonder and awe such inglorious Miltons and deserts of vast eternity.
inquiry inspires. (It is no wonder they write The poet in all of us seeks above all an aesthetic
books with titles such as The Artful Universe and order that accords significance to the physical
the Elegant Universe.) As Dewey stressed, no and logical, and extends our understanding to
experience, be it dead cat or entropic universe, what we find qualitative. So as you enjoy chasing
is complete unless it is given aesthetic expres- butterflies, forgive us our oceanic feelings, since
sion. Physical order or logical order must be they include you too, as a creature of the syncomplemented by aesthesia, giving vivid sensi- chronicity of existence. We are no doubt all a
bility to an otherwise anaesthetic world. A scurvy lot, but when we let our imaginations and
cosmos with meaning would be one in which the curiosities soar, sometimes we do sparkle among
Second Law of Thermodynamics and Scurvy the stars.
both have a place, wherein both the inexorable
and the pitiable are included.
There is a long intellectual tradition that

f

SAY GRACE
"What's there to eat?"
"Hot tongue
and cold shoulder,"
a man remarks
to his friend as they lower the shaft
of a fencepost into a hole
they've dug
in the man's lawn,
his friend belly-laughing
while nearby the man's son watches
the work
but doesn't get the joke
until he sees his mother,
her face
blunt as the sledge his father wields.
It feels

like aeons on a family trip,
the way his future reels
up to him,
parents glum, an only child staring
out the car window
until
the boy came to see
his life
as curves ahead, sirens gaining, him
speeding to outdistance
his painall those years
with his fists on the wheel.
So how is it now
he stands in the glow
of his own kitchen, hooping his arms
around his wife
where her womb's begun to grow?
"You hungry?"
he asks. "Let's make dinner."

Daniel Tobin
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Professor Said, Meet Ms. Austen

Jennifer Voigt
The summer between my sophomore and
junior years in college I worked in a retail establishment with a woman I'll call Cindy who
intended to start at a local community college in
the fall as an English major, planning to become
a high school teacher. As a consequence of this
mall's declining power, we had few customers,
so the hours passed slowly. Cindy wasn't the
sharpest tack in the drawer, but I was nonetheless happy to pass the time talking to someone
who shared some of my interests. One night we
got to talking about movies. It was the summer
that the Kevin Costner vehicle Robin Hood:
Prince of Thieves was in theatres, and as the conversation came around to this film, my coworker's utterances became weirder and
weirder. I mentioned that in my opinion it was
the worst film ever made after Top Gun (I had
yet to see Flashdance) and further, I asked, why
do bad films always have to manipulate the characters' identities so as to make them all related
to each other at the end? The whole thing about
Robin Hood and Will Scarlet turning out to be
brothers struck me as the most contrived aspect
of a completely contrived film, I said. Cindy
looked thoughtful for a moment and then
replied, "But it followed the book really well." I
stared at her. "Which book?"
"Robin Hood: Prince ofThieves. I bought it
so I could read it before I saw the movie." At that
moment she produced from her bag a paperback
novelization of the movie-the kind that studio
marketing departments produce and sell at the
checkout stands in supermarkets.
After I looked to see that neither one of us
had turned into a rhinoceros, I tried to explain
to her the concept of a novelization of a filmthat some writer, probably not working under

his or her own name, takes the final draft of the
screenplay and adds the "he saids" and "she
saids" to it. Cindy would have none of it. She
insisted that what she had read was a novel, and
furthermore, that the movie was good because it
followed the novel word for word. I was dumbstruck, which for me is a rarity.
Cindy, of course, was just voicing a fairly
commonly-held belief about the relationship of
novels to the films made from them. Her notion
was that the novel holds some sort of authority
over the film that might come of it. She felt certain that a novel is something a priori and a film
is just a shadow on the wall of a cave. In order to
be "good," a film made of a novel must follow
the printed matter on which it is based to the
letter, so to speak. After ten years of various versions of this conversation, I find myself more
impatient with it than ever. Aligning oneself with
a novel against the film apparently makes you
seem learned-after all, you read. But it also
assumes that novels are "great" and that films
are "popular." But those of us who love both
words and images know better.
Cindy's arguments irritate me above all
others because she was looking for authority
from the wrong medium. Robin Hood: Prince
of Thieves owes less to folk tales about Sherwood Forest that it does to the earlier Robin
Hood pictures with Douglas Fairbanks, Jr.,
Errol Flynn, or Richard Todd. Cindy wouldn't
have to look farther than the costuming to see
the influence. (Mel Brooks saw it right away,
and called his parody of Prince of Thieves, Men
in Tights.)
I wonder if Cindy saw any of the Merchant/Ivory productions based on E.M.Forster's
novels. She would have like them; they certainly
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are what she thought of as excellent examples of
their genre. They were the Academy's cup of tea
too, as on at least one occasion they gave the pair
the Oscar for best screenplay. It is fundamentally
sad that the most visible organization dedicated
solely to the promotion of film sees its subject as
the bastard child of novels. The M/I films followed the novels so exactly you could bring a
flashlight and read along right there in the theatre. They were lovely, too. Around the time
Howards End came out a well-meaning friend
decided that I'd be the kind of person who
would like a gift subscription to Victoria Magazine. Victoria drooled over Howards End as it
drooled over Remains of the Day a few years
later. Vintage lace! Vintage tarts on the vintage
plates on the table that had been expertly set by
the consultant who happens to be the only
person alive in England who remembers that in
the old houses one set the knife precisely three
inches from the right of the plate ....The minutiae were exhausting. The props are pretty but
the films lack real visual texture.
Worse, what were these films doing there
in the theatre in the late nineteen eighties and
early nineties? They told us nothing about ourselves, except that nostalgia for arcane objects is
a powerful marketing tool, perhaps responsible
for such oddities as Restorations Hardware's
school lunch tray. Worse yet, the films were
rather popular, so much so that a director and
producer unrelated to the M/I team optioned
Forster's first novel, Where Angels Fear to Tread,
and cast Helena Bonham Carter, an M/I favorite,
to play the lead.
Why would you want a film to reproduce
exactly the novel on which it is based? One
common complaint I hear is that filmmakers
change the endings. Presumably the movie-going
public has less tolerance for unhappy endings
than does a book-reading one. But I'm not sure
that such changes are always a bad thing. The
ending of Peter Carey's Oscar and Lucinda made
me so gloomy that only my Bronco-fan-husband's exuberant return from their victorious
Superbowl appearance saved me from something drastic. Seeing a less-grim movie version
of Lucinda's fate gave me an alternative ending
for the story in my mind, without diminishing
my enthusiasm for what has become one of my
favorite novels.
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Though Ralph Fiennes and Cate Blanchett
were wonderful in the roles, and Cindy would
have approved a screenplay that, until the last
five minutes, followed the book exactly, I found
myself still dissatisfied. Massive amounts of the
book had been cut to fit the movie's short timeframe, and we thus missed what novels do best:
rationales for motivations, long expositions,
elaborate character introductions. So, why not
take liberties when you make a film from a
novel? Why not acknowledge that film and
novels are two different media and make something wonderful?
Do even filmmakers believe that because
film enjoys a popular following it is in some way
a lesser art? High school English teachers perpetuate this understanding as they fill holes in
their lesson plans, routinely "rewarding" students for reading The Scarlet Letter, or Lord of
the Flies or To Kill a Mockingbird by showing
the film versions. When I was in school the
teachers would give us these breaks after we'd
turned in our papers or taken our tests on the
books, the underlying assumption being that
watching the movie was a far less intellectually
strenuous activity than actually reading the
book. I remember becoming wise to the ploy of
assigning novels whose film versions incorporated serious differences from the original,
thereby catching out those unwary students
who might be tempted to rent the video rather
than plowing through all those pages. I wondered, as I watched Angela's Ashes-so scrupulously attentive to the book, and then so apt to
skip large sections like a dirty CO-had its
maker so thoroughly absorbed his high school
training in the dominance of the book? Both
teachers and students would benefit from a
wider and deeper teaching of film studies in
public schools.
Patricia Rozema's recent Mansfield Park, by
contrast, suffers from no novel envy whatsoever.
Rather, it announces its film presence in one
shot. At first we think it's just an obligatory transition shot of stagecoach on a highway. But then
we see the man with the sickle in the foreground-surely superfluous to the narrativeand we laugh. This homage to Bergman in the
middle of Austen's England makes so much
sense: it's telling you that you are no longer in
Austen's England.

Of course, this is not completely true.
Mansfield Park satisfies the cursory requirements
for film adaptations: it introduces all of the
major characters, puts them in situations drawn
from the novel, pays attention to the author 's
original narrative, and pairs everybody off as
that author intended at the end of the film. But
its genius lies in its understanding of itself as
both a film and a product of a literary tradition.
The film may borrow imagery from Seventh Seal
as a way of staking out its territory in movieland,
but it is also very concerned with the problems
inherent in the novel, as well as in Austen's own
circumstances. Rozema is interested not only in
Fanny's struggles to exist in her dual roles as
guest and servant, but also in revealing to
viewers-by means that Austen would never
have dreamed- the obstacles that lie in her way.
Austen could never have dreamed Edward
Said, but in the film her Mansfield Park characters eat, drink and speak his reading of the
novel. Said's paper, "Jane Austen and Empire"
provides the subtext to Austen's love story. In
the paper, Said applies post-colonialist theory
to the novel in order to demonstrate that the
idea of an imperial mission was fully formed in
the British mind well before the "scramble for
Africa" and the establishment of British raj in
India. Questions that might have drifted
through our minds as we read the novel-e.g.
just what is Fanny's uncle doing in Antigua and
what might that have to do with the everyday
goings-on of an English country estate ?-get
answers here. Through Said we see Mansfield
Park as a kind of internal colony, and Fanny as a
colonist, exported from her overpopulated
home, and, like the criminals transported to
Australia, expected never to return.
The film appropriates Said's interpretation
to turn Austen's story inside out as it were, to
expose the bits that Austen, whether through
propriety, but probably more through priorityAusten in Said's view is pre-colonial-leaves
swathed in mystery. The estate's family, the
Bertrams, owns slaves. In one scene, Sir Thomas
Bertram's entire operation in Antigua is illustrated, literally, in morbid detail, down to the
basest of cruelties that the characterized slavery.
Need we say that such a scene does not appear
in the novel? In the film it opens Fat:J.ny's eyes to
the secrets that Mansfield Park hides. In a scene

reminiscent of those moments of gothic "discovery" that Austen herself found so risible,
Fanny discovers her cousin Tom's drawings of
the plantation. As she flips through them, her
bodily spasms recapitulate the gothic heroine's
encounters of horrors previously beyond their
imagination. Fanny-helplessly turning the
pages-witnesses a rape, and experiences a thorough physical revulsion.
The film's post-colonialist understanding
frees Tom Bertram from the novel's narrow portrayal of him as simply wayward and rebellious.
Instead, we see his drunken ranting as the revelation of his bad conscience. He has retreated
into alcoholism as a way of dealing with the particular responsibilities of being heir to Mansfield
Park: this elaborate household is dependent on a
fortune generated by slave labor. His illness,
which in the book merely warns him of the
moral dangers of too much partying and sets him
on the course of "being useful to his father," in
the case of the film awakens the entire family to
the evil from which they have so long benefitted.
By investing him with a conscience, the film rescues Tom from the long and colorful list of
Austen rakes and includes him in the great
Romantic tradition of troubled, substanceabusing heroes who die young for hopeless
causes.
Though the film takes the context of
slavery seriously, it doesn't always take Tom's
Romantic self-aggrandizing solemnly. The revolutionary ambitions of the Romantic poets were
jokes long before Rowan Atkinson spoofed them
in Blackadder III. Tom is not left as the sole
exponent of the era's Romantic obsessions; we
see others as Julia's husband raves about the new
ruins he has had installed at his estate. This willingness to insult its costuming gives Mansfield
Park a freshness that so many film adaptations of
old novels lack. It reminds us that our traditions
and history do not necessarily deserve our reverence.
If this new version of Mansfield Park makes
Tom a sympathetic character, it does the same
for Fanny, the novel's highly principled heroine.
She retains the Austenesque determination to
have it all when it comes to marriage: she will
marry a man of the best character for money,
position and love. But Rozema, who wrote the
screenplay in addition to directing the film,

invests Fanny with a sense of humor as well as a
particular sense of herself that, to be frank, the
Fanny of Austen's imagination could never have
afforded. Austen's Fanny is trapped by her position as woman and guest. Her tenure at Mansfield Park is subject to the whims and generosity
of relatives who regard her as a lesser form of
human being. Her future depends on the
approval of these relatives, without whom she
will have no position in society, and so she must
be somewhat manipulative, even scheming,
sometimes apparently two-faced. Contemporary
audiences, used to the idea of women with real
choices based on real bank accounts, could
hardly be expected to sympathize with Fanny's
dilemma unless she were presented to us as
clearly forthright and honest with herself. This
is the Fanny Rozema gives us, and chances are
that today's audience will like her better than
the Fanny in Austen's novel.
The film retains the idea of Fanny as a principled person, but makes those principles easier
for the contemporary audience to understand.
The cinematic Fanny is a feminist heroine, never
content to be silent on decisions that concern
her. But even dearer to the hearts of feminists,
she has a room of her own in which she engages
her imagination by writing stories for her
younger sister at home. This addition to Fanny's
character might have flustered Austen, whose
own relationship to her work was marked by a
conviction that writing compromised her femininity. Women of her class did not write for publication without risking offense, and Austen
wrote secretly, the legend goes, depending on a
squeaky hinge of the drawing room door to
warn her of visitors and give her time to stash
her writing materials. Austen's novel ends with
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Fanny and Edmund moving into the parsonage
at Mansfield Park "just after they had been married long enough to begin to want an increase of
income, and feel their distance from the paternal
abode an inconvenience." Fanny is pregnant,
and here the story ends. But by the end of the
film, Fanny appears to be writing her own story.
Her ambitions lie somewhere beyond her marriage to Edmund. There is the indication that
this is only the first of her stories, and there are
move to come. That this conclusion is seen as a
happy ending strikes me as heartening evidence
that the situation of women has indeed
improved, despite much evidence to the contrary.
I do not know what happened to Cindy. By
the time I left for the summer she had abandoned her plans to start college and was setting
her sights on becoming the manager of our little
store. Perhaps by now she understands that stories are subtle and fluid, and that they expand
and contract into shapes related to but not
exactly like their originals. Perhaps she understands that novels are not objects of veneration,
but living documents. Perhaps she knows that
film is a medium that, like literature, has its own
language and traditions and conventions, and
that the filmmaker's responsibility to a novel has
less to do with how faithfully she follows the
story than with how imaginatively she translates
its meanings into images. If not, I hope Cindy
sees Mansfield Park soon. If she could learn these
things from any movie, it would be this one,
because it is so elegant in the way it turns its back
on those aspects of the novel for which it has no
use, while at the same time revealing the novel's
hidden context and playing with the literary tradition from which it comes. f
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Thomas C. Willadsen

I'll admit it-in my 19 months at this congregation I have failed utterly in a very important part of a pastor's job: retaining church custodians. In prior calls I have had the privilege of
serving as an associate, so the Big Guy or "Head
Cheese" as I liked to call him, had to deal with
personnel issues. I had the luxury of sitting back
and watching how it was done. Better than I'm
doing, I have learned.
The position of church custodian seems to
attract a wide emotional range. Some people
stumble into the position because they have
failed at all other jobs. In that way it is like the
ministry. Except that custodians have a lower
level of education. Some men seek to work for
the church after having bad experiences with
bosses and hope that the Church can be a
healing, motherly presence for them. While this
may be true, the floors still need to be swept and
mopped, the grass mowed, the pews dusted.
One church custodian I knew was more of a janitorial philosopher than a janitor. He thought
and reasoned about how work should be done
around the church but did not actually do much
work.
For a time Socrates had an assistant to help
him change lightbulbs. Every Sunday I greeted
Ray and said, "How are you?"
"Not bad for an old duffer."
"Hey, Ray, you're not a duffer."
We fell into this pattern easily and naturally. He was really pleasant, but not exactly
driven.
On the other extreme are what I call 'preventive custodians." These men are so into
having the floors perfectly waxed that they
scream to keep people off them, sometimes for
months.

"You know how hard I worked to wax that
floor?"
"Really, really, really hard?"
"That's right, and I'm not gonna have the
Sewing Circle, the Mission Committee, or your
dang Youth Group mess 'em up!"
The floors stay nice, but everyone fears
Cerberus, who spends his 30 hours per week
keeping messes from happening rather than
cleaning them up.
All my observation of senior pastors handling custodians and their various pathologies
did not prepare me for today.
When I arrived here we had a bear of a
sloth in the custodian's position. Sammy was a
great guy, could talk about the Cubs' bullpenor anything else-for hours. My predecessor
warned me-"You have to keep on Sammy, he
doesn't see dirt." Which was true. It wasn't a
problem with his vision, but his perception. His
wife would come in with him on Saturday
morning to dust in the sanctuary because he
simply could not do it. Sometimes he mopped
the floors with dirty water, so they looked worse
after he had mopped them. Still, he was reliable
and a pretty good communicator. He was always
there to shovel the snow. I have learned that it is
better for a church custodian to be a great communicator and a fair cleaner, than the other way
around.
Last summer we learned that Sammy was
moonlighting, he was working as a custodian at
another church. (It's a small town; word travels
fast.) I asked him about it, and he explained that
he was just helping them out during the summer
until they found someone permanent and he
went back full-time at the grade school where he
worked. He really liked working at my church
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and the people have always been fair to him and
treated him well. If he did ever leave he
promised to give at least two weeks' notice.
I cut my vacation short to get back for
Sammy's annual review. He quit that day. Picked
up his check and left the keys in the office.
We started looking for another custodian.
It is not easy to find someone for a 25 hour-aweek job with no benefits in a community with
two percent unemployment.
We had two applicants. One of them, at his
interview with the Personnel Committee, reeked
of fortified wine, Wild Irish Rose if my memory
from college days is accurate, and could not
recall the name of the grade school where he
worked full time. The other was eager and energetic and disabled by an eye condition.
Anyone who has ever hired someone
knows there are certain things that just do not
come up in an interview, like
"Can you read?"
"Were you dishonorably discharged from
the Armed Services?"
"Do you have trouble taking direction from
women?"
"How do you deal with anger?"
The day that Reggie started work we broke
ground on a building addition. Cutting through
100-year-old stone and brick put a fair amount
of dust in the air, dust that lingered in the air and
fell very slowly over the course of many hours.
Reggie could literally sweep any room in the
church and return the next day and find that his
work had been for naught. That was discouraging and frustrating; he wanted to do a good
job.
We soon learned that Reggie's eye problem
was temperamental. He could not read notes
from our administrative assistant or bookkeeper.
He read my notes just fine, however. My handwriting (I think we call it "penpersonship" now,
don't we?) is the worst on the staff. But I am the
only male staff member. Hmm ....
When we had big, nasty, grubby projects,
Reggie really dug in. Too much. Like the time he
was stripping a floor that hadn't been stripped
in decades and was pouring stripper straight
from the bottle. We all got a little woozy from
the fumes. Reggie had to stay home a few days
after that. Hauling trash out of the boiler room
was another favorite task. The boiler room had
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been our church's repository for crap since the
Eisenhower Administration, but in one morning
Reggie and a member of the Property Committee cleared it out. He had to rest up after that,
but we sure appreciated his efforts. It would
have been nice if he had cleaned the bathrooms
weekly, or even weakly, but to Reggie the Presbyterian equivalent of the stables of King Augeas
held more allure.
Reggie was an angry man. Give him a topic
and he could be angry about it: gangs, kids,
health care, his wife, pollution, the firm doing
the renovation, his landlords-in some way
these had all let him down, in some cases, years
ago.
I started thinking of him as "The Federal
Reserve of Rage." Combine this tendency with
solitary, repetitive and under-appreciated work,
and you've got a time bomb on your hands.
Tick, tick, tick ....
The explosion came after Easter when I
learned that Reggie had not come to
work on Maundy Thursday because he did not
feel well enough after a botched suicide attempt.
Experts say that sometimes suicide attempts are
attention-getting efforts. This one worked. I got
Reggie in to see a county Clinical Services counselor the day after learning of his attempt. The
next day the counselor's supervisor called me to
let me know that the police and another government agency had been put on alert because of
the things he said to his counselor. I spent a very
memorable Thursday with my computer on split
screen. On the left I was writing my sermon for
Sunday, on the right, keeping a log of calls from
the locksmith, the police and the FBI.
By Monday he had chosen to resign rather
than go to counseling, on the church's nickel,
for his anger problem.
We found two more applicants. One was a
woman who had glowing references from the
church she served as part-time custodian and
one from a drowsy young man who just might
find the ambition to complete his GED. We
chose the woman. She appeared for work her
first day and quit. Her husband said she simply
couldn't fit in another 20 hours a week.
"I could maybe do 10 hours, he thinks ... "
"Job's 20." I was steamed.
"Was there another applicant?"
"That's my problem. I'm sorry this didn't
work out."

We hired Sleepy. One of his references said,
"You'll be lucky to get him to work for you."
There are two ways to take that comment; we
chose the favorable reading and got burned. He
worked in 45 -minute increments, said that his
keys did not work, when they did, and could not
take the city bus to work, even though it passed
his house every half hour and dropped him,
without his having to transfer, two blocks from
church. During the week he held the position of
custodian (I can't say, "the week he worked
here," because he didn't, technically, work) he
left me the following note:
"I'll be in tomorrow mourning after 7:00
AM to vacum." I knew what he meant, but he
didn't show. And didn't show and didn't show.
Finally, one day in the midst of Sleepy's not
working here, a man came in off the street
needing forty bucks so he could get his car fixed.
My reflex was to say, "We have a custodian,
thankyouverymuch." But I could not lie. I really
was not sure whether we had a custodian. I put
him to work doing some jobs that I knew Sleepy,
if he ever was kissed by the handsome prince and
came to work, would never do. Speedy did them
eagerly. Too eagerly. There was a pathological
eagerness about him that made me a little ner-

vous. He wahted to landscape our twelve blades
of grass. But he can work inside too, he told me
breathlessly.
So we're looking for a custodian, again. I
am not at all optimistic. Every business in town
is looking for workers, pays better than we do,
and offers benefits. I could use that stale line
about our retirement program being heavenly
but fear that would attract a new breed: janitorial theologian.
What is the sound of Welch's grape juice
fermenting in a forgotten communion cup?
One function that is not in the custodian's
job description is serving as the conscience of the
church. Even bad, slothful, dangerous custodians ask what to do with boxes that people
leave at random around the building. With no
one in the position of custodian for five months,
garbage has started to pile up. So now it's my job
to get people to clean up their rooms, take the
cans to the recycler, take the dead fluorescent
tubes (33 at last count) to the annual drop-off
day, and clear the decade-old computer manuals
out of the conference room.
I'm really enjoying it! In fact, if they could
make it full time and offer a pension, I might
interview. f

THE POET AT THREESCORE

My maple tree, stripped of every leaf,
lifts the new buds it has ventured
against a raging November dawn.

William R. Mitchell
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In a time when publications find that they must become increasingly partisan to maintain support,
The Cresset is uniquely multi-voiced, with its tradition of thoughtful, provocative reflection on issues
for people of faith. Like all good things, The Cresset needs the backing of people who believe in it, and
your help is needed to make sure that this unique journal survives and flourishes. If you are interested
in helping to ensure The Cresset's future with a gift for an endowment, please contact The Editor, or
the Department of Institutional Advancement at VU.
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Occasionally, friends of the Cresset send checks that help us to manage extra-budgetary outlays.
(We have no "equipment line" for computers, for example, and when we must replace hardware, we
have relied on our Gift Account for funds.) This year, looking in our storage closet, we discover that we
have a number of copies of The Pilgrim and Christmas Garlands, anthologies of short pieces by 0. P.
Kretzmann. Both volumes were published by The Walther League and Concordia Publishing House;
The Pilgrim is a second edition from 1946, and Christmas Garlands is a first edition from 1950. For
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The herald angels' song is an everlasting antiphony.. .It moves down the
centuries above, beneath, and in the earth from Christmas to Christmas to
Christmas .. .In it ftlone is hope before death and after death ...Their song
lives to the 2,0oot Christmas, to the 3,oooth, and at length to the last
Christmas the world will see ... And on that final Christmas, as on the first, the
angels will know, as we must know now, that the heart which began to beat in
Bethlehem still beats in the world and for the world ... And for us ...
O.P. Kretzmann

The Pilgrim

Many years will pass before you understand Christmas.. .In fact,
you will never understand it completely... But you can always believe in
it, always . . .The Child has come to keep us company... To tell us that
heaven is nearer than we had dared to think... To put the hope of eternity in our eyes...To tell us that the manger is never empty for those
who return to it. . .And you will find with Him, I know, a happiness
which you will never find alone ...
O.P. Kretzmann

Christmas Garlands
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sickly, "emaciated" man whom
Timothy Cutler, writing in 1739,
doubted would live to age forty?
Edwards is but one of an array
of Protestant thinkers treated by
Morgan, an art historian at ValIn this book about Protestants paraiso University, in this wideand images, it is a delicious irony to ranging book. Morgan's central
find Jonathan Edwards invoked in concern-the effect of mechanithe opening pages. Of all the Amer- cally reproduced images on American figures standing in the tradi- ican Protestant piety-emerges out
tion of Puritan iconoclasm, none of his earlier books on religion and
has become more of an icon in our images: Visual Piety: A History and
own day. Ever since the Harvard lit- Theory of Popular Religious Images
erary historian and reputed atheist (California, 1998), which considers
Perry Miller sought to demonstrate Catholic and Protestant sources
Edwards' genius in a 1949 biog- from the Middle Ages to the preraphy, the colonial pastor has been sent, and Icons of American Protesthe source of an unending stream of tantism: The Art of Warner Sal/man
dissertations and other scholarly (Yale, 1996), an edited collection
activity. Yet in contemporary evan- with essays by five other authors on
gelical circles, as in the eighteenth the ubiquitous portraitist of Jesus.
century, Edwards remains best Like his earlier works, Morgan's
known as the patron saint of latest volume is a sophisticated
revivalism. Sometimes this hagiog- treatment of the tension between
raphy has led to distortions of his- word and image that has bedeviled
tory, for Edwards himself betrayed Protestants ever since the sixteenthsignificant ambivalence over the century wars against Catholic
excesses of the "Great Awakening." · "idolatry." Morgan illustrates the
The current lionization of Edwards complexity of the question in his
the revivalist has even led to icono- discussion of Edwards, whose
graphic manipulation. In his new word-pictures in such famous serbook, Protestants and Pictures, mons as "Sinners in the Hands of an
David Morgan does not discuss Angry God" were as vivid as any
Edwards himself as icon, but the material images of divine things.
example is apt here. Only one con- Edwards' fertile imagination sugtemporaneous portrait of Edwards, gests the hazards of applying the
clad in powdered wig and Geneva label "iconoclast" in unqualified
bands, survives, but on the cover of ways to American Protestants, and
a recent popular biography, issued indeed, in the rest of his book,
by Barbour Publishing, his soft, Morgan narrates the gradual rise of
even feminine, features are trans- printed devotional images as an
formed into a tanned, sinewy important component of popular
visage. Could this virile specimen of Protestant piety.
evangelical masculinity be the same
Even the Puritans, as Morgan
David Morgan. Protestants and
Pictures: Religion, Visual Culture,
and the Age of American Mass Production. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

points out, were not averse to all
images: woodcuts, especially of an
abstract and allegorical character,
had appeared in the printed literature of Protestantism from the
beginning. But images for the English dissenters and their American
successors were primarily didactic
rather than devotional in function,
and this would remain true of most
Protestant iconography until at
least the mid-nineteenth century. In
his first three chapters, Morgan
explores the relation between word
and image in the evangelical Protestant establishment of the antebellum republic. Driven by a deepseated reformist impulse, evangelical Protestants took advantage of
ever-improving printing technologies and methods of distribution to
help create the first truly mass culture in American history. Organizations such as the American Tract
Society, founded on classical republican notions of benevolence and
civic order, unleashed a flood of
printed materials in which didactic
images helped propagate what
Morgan
calls
a
"national
mythology" of "expanding boundaries emanating from an inner
heartland." The advance of Christian America was premised on the
defeat of alien forces, whether from
without or within, and thus Tract
Society pictures depicted the vices
not only of exotic peoples such as
the Indians and the Catholic priesthood but also of those AngloProtestants
themselves
who
eschewed such middle class virtues
as sobriety and industry. Women
figured prominently in this didactic
iconography, for they were the nur-

turers of domestic piety and therefore a key element in Protestant
hopes for the millennium. Millennia! hope was also tied up in the
very technology of printing-the
engine of the sixteenth-century
Reformation-and Morgan's lavishly illustrated book includes several wonderfully ironic Protestant
depictions of the printing press and
the printed Bible. Almost as quickly
as images had been rejected, the
printed word itself became a
Protestant icon and the alleged
instrument of the millennia! dawn.
Perhaps no Protestants in the
nineteenth century were as millennialistic as the Millerites or Adventists, and Morgan devotes two full
chapters to the complex iconography of this movement. Standing
apart from the evangelical mainstream, William Miller and his followers mapped the coming apocalypse with unusual precision, setting themselves up for the famous
"Great Disappointment" when the
Second Coming failed to materialize in either 1843 or 1844, as predicted. Millerites regarded the
Bible as the exclusive source of all
knowledge about the future, but by
the 1840s, the movement's leaders
were perfecting the genre of the
prophetic chart as a more pedagogically effective presentation of
scriptural truths. These illustrated
schematic diagrams, with their
"curious iconography of beasts,
trumpets, seals, and vials," were in
fact quite rationalistic, as Morgan
perceptively argues, because they
presumed a "single message plainly
encoded in scripture." Reducing
biblical books such as Daniel and
Revelation to charts also helped
standardize exegesis among the
Millerites, though disagreements
occasionally occurred. In a clever
bit of historical detective work,
Morgan reproduces two competing
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drawings, based on the same 1840
engraving, of the five-horned sheep
of Daniel8:9. In one, the little horn
is labeled "Mahomet," in the other,
"Rome."
Eventually, though, the stylized woodcut engravings of the
Millerite charts gave way to images
produced by the more sophisticated
technique of lithography. Popularized by firm of Currier and Ives,
this technology allowed much more
realistic depiction of light, shade,
space and perspective, and thus
produced images of a more photographic quality.
Lithography
received a huge boost in 1869 when
the sisters Catharine Beecher and
Harriet Beecher Stowe, in The
American Woman's Home, advocated the use of chromo (or color)
lithographs as tasteful decoration
for the home. Over the next two
decades, the Adventists James and
Ellen White seized upon this technique to produce a new kind of
image, which unlike the old charts,
lacked accompanying text but
instead included heroic depictions
of the crucified Christ and other
biblical figures. The purpose of
such images was less didactic than
devotional; they were designed to
elicit an affective response from the
viewer. As Morgan writes: "The
days of austerity were past. The
visual culture of Seventh-Day
Adventism was quickly adjusting to
the larger marketplace of American
Protestantism, indeed, even leading
the way."
Morgan then returns to mainstream Protestants and explores at
length the use of images in Victorian-era religious pedagogy. As theologians like Horace Bushnell
wrote persuasively about Christian
nurture, Protestants of many stripes
realized that images were useful
because they were, as Morgan puts
it, "lively, sensible, and striking,

which is to say that they curbed certain behaviors by actively grasping
the young person's attention." Like
the Adventists, mainline Protestants
increasingly focused on the emotional response that images, more
than text, seemed to produce. Pictures designed to inspire fear, revulsion, pity, shame, comfort, humor,
and surprise therefore became a
mainstay of Protestant children's
literature.
Protestant interest in images
and the emotions was reinforced by
the rise of photography and
halftone reproduction, which permitted subtler depiction of the
human face than ever before. Perhaps inevitably, this led to a new
Protestant iconography of Jesus as
realistic paintings of the face of
Christ were reproduced by the
thousands in halftone. The halftone
also made possible the precise and
inexpensive reproduction of the
great works of art in the Western
Christian tradition, democratizing
access to these masterpieces in "gift
books" and other printed materials.
Indeed, Morgan calls the halftone
the "decisive factor" in the emergence of a fully devotional iconography within American Protestantism by the 1890s. Countless
Protestants made Christ images the
centerpieces of both the public and
domestic "church," belying the old
axiom that Protestantism entailed
devotion to the word alone.
Morgan further contendsand this is his book's overarching
argument-that far from dissipating the "aura" of the religious
image (as typified, for example, by
the medieval icons of the saints},
techniques of mechanical reproduction simply made this aura available
for mass consumption. In making
this argument, he refutes an essay
by the late German critic Walter
Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the

Age of Mechanical Reproduction,"
which Morgan notes has achieved
an almost "cult status" since its
publication in English in 1968.
Benjamin insisted that once images
were mass-produced, and therefore
relieved of the unique status conferred by tradition and ritual, they
were deprived of their "aura."
Morgan is surely right to criticize
this view; in fact, his case would
only have been strengthened by the
example of modern American
Catholicism, in which mass-produced crucifixes and other devotional objects often seem fraught
with "a mysterious sense of presence," to use his own words.
But Morgan is concerned with
Protestants, and here the question
of "aura" is more murky. Is sixteenth-century iconophobia fully
transcended in the age of mechanical reproduction, or does theology
for most Protestants still get in the
way of a truly iconographic piety?
Ambivalence over images should
not, of course, be confused with
lack of imagination, as capacious
thinkers like Jonathan Edwards
(and those contemporary evangelicals who would improve on his
visage) attest. Yet one wonders how
much ~'aura" mere images can have
for the vast numbers of American
Protestants who deny any real
"presence" to the central ritual of
Christianity's public cult-the
Eucharist. Morgan's book is the
rare work that prompts such tantalizing cultural questions on virtually every page. His analysis adds
great depth to our understanding of
the old dialectic between word and
image that, far from being resolved
by the Reformation, continues to
define and enliven American religious culture-often in unexpected
ways.
Peter J. Thuesen

booklines
Lamentations over the state of
higher learning in America have
steadily increased in both number
and intensity of conviction over the
last twenty-five years. Happily,
there are books that cut against that
grain. I will mention four, each of
them more complimentary than
hostile to the vast contemporary
project of higher education in the
United States. Two of the four are
among the five best books on liberal
education that I have yet read.
If you are going to write a
book that offers a favorable view of
higher learning in America, you
must begin, if only to establish credibility, with a relatively new rhetorical strategy. Let me call this new
trope the meta-jeremiad, a literary
form that expresses studied alarm
at the number of works that express
hysterical alarm at the alleged
decline in the quality of college and
university education. If you practice this strategy you must show
that a) you know of many jeremiads
about higher education issued with
tiresome regularity during all
periods of American history; b) you
know that nevertheless there was
never a golden age of American
higher education and therefore all
declensionist models are suspect;
and c) you know that therefore all
of these jeremiads, past and present, are historically naive at best.
One of the few books that
earns the right to begin in this
manner is Francis Oakley's Community of Learning (Oxford,
1992), a deeply learned, beautifully
written, and lovingly rendered
account of the tradition of liberal
education. Oakley's account differs
from most others of this sort by
virtue of his training as a medieval
historian and his experience as the
president of Williams, one of the

finest liberal arts colleges in this
country. Half of the book (about
seventy pages) consists of a history
of the liberal arts tradition from
ancient times to the present. The
other half consists of a seasoned
assessment of the present state of
the tradition in the US. The book is
a pleasure to read for two reasons:
first, it is composed in the grand
style without seeming pompous or
self-promoting; second and more
important, the wisdom of the discourse should convince friends of
liberal education that matters are
not nearly as bad as most of us in
the trenches think they are most of
the time.
Readers who prefer an easier
and more tendentious defense of
liberal education might read
Martha Nussbaum's Cultivating
Humanity: A Classical Defense of
Liberal Education (Harvard, 1997).
The book consists of a combination
of largely cheerful reports from the
field interspersed with Nussbaum's
own defense of an ideal of liberal
learning that emphasizes critical
thinking and the cultivation of a
cosmopolitan frame of mind. Along
the way, Nussbaum strives to reassure her readers that relatively new
emphases on race, class, gender,
and multiculturalism are more
often than not extensions of a venerable tradition of liberal education. And she is often as harsh in her
criticisms of the postmodern left as
she is of the traditionalist right.
Even so, the book lacks self-critical
attention to the cosmopolitan ideal
it espouses, and it sets up sharp
antitheses between tradition and
critical thinking that some of her
own best earlier work, e.g. The
Fragility of Goodness would undermine. At its worst, the argument
deteriorates into a recitation of liberal bromides. Nussbaum's book
would have been much improved

had the historical perspective and
nuance that characterize Oakley's
work informed it.
The remaining two books
both treat in some detail the social
and political dimensions of higher
education in America, and like the
first pair, one of them is very
demanding while the other is a brief
set of reflections in the spirit of Mill
and Dewey on the present state of
liberal education and its relationship to democracy. The more
demanding work is Eva Brann's
Paradoxes of Education in a Democracy (University of Chicago, 1979).
In the short space of 150 pages,
Brann endeavors to expose and
examine the roots of several
intractable and to some degree
"tragic" dilemmas that have beset
higher learning in the US from the
outset. The persistent tensions
between liberal and utilitarian
studies in a democracy, between
tradition and innovation, and
between the dubious imperative to
"think for yourself" on the one
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hand and the need for something
like consensus in public life on the
other are built into the very structure of the project of seeking to
educate the citizens of a democratic
republic, according to Brann. Professor Brann shows her years of
devotion to St. John's College in
defining tradition simply as "a collection of books ... to be immediately and crisply confronted,
without interpretive intervention
or predigestion." And she does
advance some highly debatable
views without argument, such as
the notion that "Western learning is
precisely not a training for the soul
or a way of life but theory." On the
whole, however, she exemplifies
what she everywhere extols,
inquiry into a very complicated set
of questions in considerable depth.
By contrast to Brann, Alan
Ryan's Liberal Anxieties and Liberal
Education (Hill and Wang, 1998)
offers a comparatively breezy and
on the whole optimistic account of
the many salutary connections

between liberal education and liberal democracy. His book is occasionally rather like Nussbaum's in
terms of the liberal virtues that it
defends without much critical
scrutiny. Ryan's book is nevertheless much more appealing than
Nussbaum's if only because it manifests more common sense than special pleading.
Here then are two courses of
study about higher education in the
United States today, the harder and
relatively more conservative one
through Oakley and Brann and the
easier and relatively more liberal
one through Nussbaum and Ryan. I
very much prefer the first course to
the second. But readers who want a
wide sample of articulate appreciations of the state of liberal education in our time would do best to
read all four.
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